os-issue-tracker

The GrapheneOS team did not respond to an email report either [0]. Does that mean we can draw similar conclusions from the GrapheneOS team? I don't think that would be fair or correct, so why assume malice from Google just based on the (lack of) response to the report? N.B. I don't disagree there is a possibility of foul play on Google's part, but I think more evidence / better argument is required. [0] https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/8617#i...

Regarding cellular connection, the proof of concept presented here only works on wifi: https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/8617 I have a hunch this leak is bound to wifi hardware only, for details: https://supuk.ch/papers/android-natt-keepalive-vpn-bypass

Is this the relevant issue for Graphene OS? https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/664 Upvote the issue if so.

There are reasons to remain on Google Android for now, though. For example, QuickShare compatibility with AirDrop[1,2], or compatibility with certain banking apps[3]. [1] https://www.android.com/quick-share/with-iphone/ [2] https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/6550 [3] https://grapheneos.org/usage#banking-apps

One clarification: > It backs up data for apps opting out of cloud backups with allowBackup="false" This is untrue for older apps targeting API 30 (Android 11) and earlier. As I understand it, allowBackup is still respected for them, preventing their backup even in D2D mode. https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/1112#i... Those apps are slowly going extinct since the Play Store stopped accepting updates written against the older SDK in 2022, but I gather there are still a few floating around out there (including some niche favorites that have unfortunately abandoned development). And one wish: I'd love the ability to maintain a "hotspare" device that's identical to the original in every important way. So if your phone is chucked in the ocean, dropped down a cliff, etc. you can just grab the other one (checkpointed from

A replacement for SeedVault is planned: https://grapheneos.org/features#encrypted-backups https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/4687#i...

Have you got a link to anything about hiding parallel accounts? I use GrapheneOS, and don't see anything in the UI about it. Am I looking for the wrong thing? From what I can see, it's the same as stock Android's user switching, which has obvious UI elements about switching session. I see hidden profiles is an open issue, here: https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/5003

> A Pixel 8 Pro (running GrapheneOS) > Tracker What if someone steals my bag? Hopefully the PebbleBee "Find My" device will help me recover it. In your review (from last year) of the tracker, you wrote it doesn't work with Graphene. [1] From the linked issue, looks like there's partial support now. [2] What's the experience like now on Graphene? Is it good enough for tracking a checked bag or similar? [1] https://shkspr.mobi/blog/2025/01/review-pebblebee-clip-unive... [2] https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/4079

the only problem I have with grapheneos is that it doesn't support E911 or the equivalent European standard https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/1174 Because somehow this is also a privacy issue. They're really taking this a step too far with making life-saving decisions on behalf of the user: if you call 911/112, you HAVE a reason to do so. If you somehow need to NOT share your location, it could let you OPT OUT.

Play Integrity has several levels. GrapheneOS MEETS_BASIC_INTEGRITY, which I believe only requires a locked bootloader and no superuser. There's also been some discussion of spoofing MEETS_DEVICE_INTEGRITY, since before Android 13 it didn't rely on a TPM, and many apps don't want to lock out older devices, but it's been decided against it [0]. [0] https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/1986

> by revoking network you don't lose privacy Be careful, apps can still communicate with other apps, e.g. revoking the network permission doesn't stop apps from fetching and displaying ads over the network. I don't know enough about Android internals to understand the mechanisms behind it, but clearly there are ways for apps to exfiltrate data. > Trying to use Network as a complete data exfiltration toggle isn't the intended purpose, and you should always consider apps within the profile being able to communicate for ALL data and access including permissions. It is not something only relevant to Network. https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/4024-in-what-extent-can-app... https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/2197

I was curious about this so I looked around a bit. My interpretation is that GrapheneOS still has not cracked this nut. Neither has iPhone, unless you enable "Lockdown Mode" https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/3952 https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/6076

In a similar move (silently changing a feature crucial to some users), in Android 11 Google suddenly removed the possibility to use "special" characters ":<>?|\* in filenames[0], presumably because they're not allowed on Windows/NTFS and Windows users might end up struggling to transfer them to their Windows computer. I don't care about NTFS at all, though. I just want to be able to sync all my files with my Linux machines and now I'm no longer able to. Makes me want to scream. [0]: https://github.com/GrapheneOS/os-issue-tracker/issues/952

Rooting is a very bad idea. https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/android.html#rootin... But GrapheneOS is fully open source and provides great build instructions, so you can always make your own build and add whatever features or privileged apps you like within the standard AOSP frameworks for privileged apps with system integration. > Backing up all app data via Neo Backup GrapheneOS includes Seedvault by default. https://grapheneos.org/features#encrypted-backups > High-quality call recording via Call Recorder Call recording is built into the Dialer app on GrapheneOS. https://grapheneos.org/features#encrypted-backups:~:text=Cal.... > DNS-based ad blocking is possible via apps like AdGuard DNS-based blocking can also be accomplished by using Android's native Private DNS feature with a resolver that blocks ads. You could even host your

Apparently this is handled by the privileged STK[1] service. It can launch browser which is I think what's happening. GrapheneOS presently doesn’t do anything different in this case, they pull it from AOSP without modifications. However you can disable it using the frontend app (SIM Toolkit) as someone pointed out, but as far as I can tell this requires the applet on SIM card to cooperate (offer the opt out). Otherwise you can disable the STK altogether with ADB but that will also block you out of other SIM card interactive functions, which might not be a big deal however. Edit: "We plan to add the ability to restrict the capabilities of SIM Toolkit as an attack surface reduction measure. (2022)"[2] and open issue[3]. [1] https://wladimir-tm4pda.github.io/porting/stk.html [2] https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/1492-blocking-sim-toolkit-m...