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handshake-org
hs-airdrop
JavaScript2019–2021
handshake-org / hs-airdrop

hs-airdrop

Decentralized airdrop to open source developers

11Distinct people
16Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.4KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Decentralized airdrop to open source developers

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 5:58:53 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month16 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-03-30 09:22:25 UTC to 2021-01-13 02:05:51 UTC.

02462019-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 commentsMar 20192019-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2019-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 0 submissions, 7 commentsFeb 20202020-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2020-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsJan 2021

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Mar 20192019-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-04-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Apr 20192019-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20192019-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20192019-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20192019-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20192019-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-09-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Sep 20192019-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20192019-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20192019-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20192019-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20202020-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-03-01 00:00:00 UTC707
Mar 20202020-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-04-01 00:00:00 UTC514
Apr 20202020-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20202020-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20202020-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20202020-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20202020-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20202020-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20202020-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20202020-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20202020-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-02-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

7 sources
Several apparent reports of someone trying to buy old de-activated github pgp keys. This is probably a social engineering attack - presumably the attacker is gonna want the key pair in the hope the private key will unlock... something else. What is the default linux ssh key used for that would make a good target? Personal sever instances would be hard to locate, so it is probably something central like cloud provider authentication? EDIT: Disappointingly, it's this https://github.com/handshake-org/hs-airdrop
In (Scams Subreddit): [Money for your] GitHub PGP keys – is this a scam?
we do not allow standard PGP signatures on the consensus layer. This is done for simplicity and safety. This means that a regular call to $ gpg --sign will not work for handshake airdrop proofs. As far as SSH keys go, people typically do not sign arbitrary messages with them. Because of this, we require a special tool to do both the signing and merkle proof creation. I like how they say, simplicity and safety. The right solution: Give me a random block of text, I'll sign it using my private RSA/DSA key and you can verify that I am the owner of the public key, send me the money, and everybody is happy. Alleged simplicity: Two hours I'm trying to redeem the airdrop without giving away the private key and the passphrase (hint, it's not implemented, despite the documentation somewhat references it here: h
Read the rest
ttps://github.com/handshake-org/hs-airdrop#fallback-for-hsm... ). Alleged safety: after installing dozens of NPM packages and code from whoever who, and running an algorithm that we don't know (even the developers) if it's reversible or not. I see horrible consequences: https://github.com/handshake-org/hs-airdrop/issues/31 User has key safely inside HSM, gets the key out to get free money that A16Z is supposedly giving. Reminds me the "Elon Musk gives Bitcoin on Twitter, just send YOUR PASSWORD" On the practices overall: It's unclear what the private key derivation process does and if the developers themselves truly understand it. If the developers would understand the full security implications, they would not say it's safe to do it on an air-gapped machine. The process could just multiply by two or base64 encode the private key, it would be near invisible since the whole code and theory is a big soup. All that, supposedly for privacy benefits, when at the end, you have to give your real identity and ID documents to actually withdraw/exchange the coins.
In An airdrop that preserves recipient privacy [pdf]

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