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hashbang
git-signatures
Shell2018–2022
hashbang / git-signatures · Archived

git-signatures

Git extensions for m-of-n signing and verification on commits/tags.

3Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
155GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Git extensions for m-of-n signing and verification on commits/tags.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2018-08-22 09:43:18 UTC to 2022-11-27 20:52:53 UTC.

012018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20182019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
If defi hacks can be conceivably clawed back under legal threat, I don’t see why a legal structure like a foundation can’t be relied upon to onboard new administrators of the Git repo. We could use something like multi-signature Git commits [1] to enforce repo integrity. Clients could cross-check the signatures against an approved list published by foundation members. Anyone who co-signs an unapproved fork of the foundation’s repo could have their shares in the foundation slashed. Post a ledger containing $JPEG balances to the Git repo, and require prospective foundation members obtain N JPEGs to apply for membership. The ledger would operate at a snail’s pace, but “blockchains don’t scale”. We’d just need someone to design the “L2” of Git. [1]: https://github.com/hashbang/git-signatures
In An NFT without a blockchain

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