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hashicorp
vault
Go2015–2026
hashicorp / vault

vault

A tool for secrets management, encryption as a service, and privileged access management

40Distinct people
48Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
36.5KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

A tool for secrets management, encryption as a service, and privileged access management

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year48 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-04-28 18:21:29 UTC to 2026-10-30 11:34:04 UTC.

0510152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 4 submissions, 3 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 0 submissions, 13 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC743
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13013
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

48 sources
A reference CI/CD architecture with a 2466 line helm values.yaml, whew <https://github.com/DoD-Platform-One/bigbang/blob/3.5.1/chart...> I have no idea who would win in a fight between people with literal guns and IBM's legal team <https://repo1.dso.mil/big-bang/product/packages/vault/-/blob...> vs <https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/blob/v1.20.2/LICENSE>. I guess to their credit, they do say at the top "licensing is complicated" but then go on to cite the old actual open source license that no longer applies https://github.com/DoD-Platform-One/bigbang/blob/3.5.1/docs/...
In The Deletion of Docker.io/Bitnami
OpenBao’s development seems heavily reliant on a single person, compared to multiple frequent long-term commiters to Vault. Not sure if I’d feel comfortable switching from Vault to OpenBao! I tried linking directly to contributors for last 12 months, but you still have to select the time range manually from the dropdown :( OpenBao: https://github.com/openbao/openbao/graphs/contributors?from=... Vault: https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/graphs/contributors?from=...
In OpenBao Namespaces
The combination of paginated list (last release) and transactions (this release) are a wonderful improvement over HashiCorp Vault. They're already paying dividends with the potential to implement much-requested improvements to Vault like recursive keys (https://github.com/openbao/openbao/issues/549 -- in https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/5275, the first-most upvoted issue), list filtering (https://github.com/openbao/openbao/issues/769 -- in https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/5362, the fourth-most upvoted issue), and more.
In Announcing OpenBao v2.1.0 - OSI-licensed fork of HashiCorp Vault
I was curious about this and went sniffing around and it seems that their instance metadata[1] doesn't include anything that demonstrably associates the instance with Hetzner nor your specific account, making chain of custody ... tricky. The best work-around I could come up with (not having a Hetzner account to actually kick the tires upon) is that you could inject a private key that you control into the instances via cloud-init (or volume attachment) and then sign any subsequent JWT using it. For sure it would not meet all threat models, but wouldn't be nothing either. I was hoping there was some chain of custody through Vault[2] but until Hetzner implements ANY IAM primitives, I'm guessing it's going to be a non-starter since the instances themselves do not have any identity 1: https://docs.hetzner.cloud/#server-metadata 2: https://gith
Read the rest
In Ask HN: What tools should I use to manage secrets from env files?
> Bootstrapping a new system is checking in their ssh key and running a shell script. If it interests you, both major git hosts (and possibly all of them) have and endpoint to map a username to their already registered ssh keys: https://github.com/mdaniel.keys https://gitlab.com/mdaniel.keys It's one level of indirection away from "check in a public key" in that the user can rotate their own keys without needing git churn Also, and I recognize this is departing quite a bit from what you were describing, ssh key leases are absolutely awesome because it addresses the offboarding scenario much better than having to reconcile evicting those same keys: https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/blob/v1.12.11/website/con... and while digging up that link I also discovered that Vault will allegedly do single-use passwords, too <https://github.com/hashic
Read the rest
orp/vault/blob/v1.12.11/website/con...>, but since I am firmly in the "PasswordLogin no" camp, caveat emptor with that one
In Does your startup need complex cloud infrastructure?
For software developers, `asdf`[0] and dockerized projects goes a long way. For provisioning the environment variables needed for development, HashiCorp's `vault`[1] can make that pretty simple. Combine that with `direnv` to have it load the value dynamically with: ``` # .envrc API_KEY=$(vault kv get -field=API_KEY secret/projectA/dev) ``` I also wanted to experiment using `pass`[2] instead, but messing with GPG keyrings and the like is unwieldy and not too user-friendly. It's what I use for personal projects since Vault is overkill. [0] https://github.com/asdf-vm/asdf [1] https://github.com/hashicorp/vault [2] https://www.passwordstore.org/
In Ask HN: Developer PC setup automations for company owned devices
What advantages over say, smallstep/certificates, letsencrypt/boulder, django-ca, square/certstrap, or hashicorp/vault (and e.g. OpenWRT's luci-app-acme ACMEv2 GUI) does Anchor offer? https://github.com/topics/acme applications/luci-app-acme/htdocs/luci-static/resources/view/acme.js: https://github.com/openwrt/luci/blob/master/applications/luc... https://openwrt.org/docs/guide-user/services/tls/acmesh https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/tutorials/secrets-mana... https://github.com/hashicorp/vault : > Refer to Build Certificate Authority (CA) in Vault with an offline Root for an example of using a root CA external to Vault.
In Show HN: Anchor – developer-friendly private CAs for internal TLS

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