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hexpm
hex
Elixir2015–2024
hexpm / hex

hex

Package manager for the Erlang ecosystem.

4Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Package manager for the Erlang ecosystem.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 12:54:37 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-07-09 18:18:43 UTC to 2024-10-02 19:07:02 UTC.

012015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
An interesting coincidence is I noticed what I thought (and maybe is) a similar bug in the elixir hex module on the same day that this bug report was submitted to openssl. If you look at the hex partial chain method (https://github.com/hexpm/hex/blob/master/lib/hex/api.ex#L59-...) you can see it goes through all the certificates the other party supplied starting from the first one and tries to find one that is signed by a certificate in the trust store. it then explicitly returns it as the trusted_ca which effectively means the certificate has the CA bit set on it. in order to exploit the attack in hex you need find a CA that will directly issue certificates off of a certificate in a trust store. apparently, this is not the recommended policy for CAs. so I made this tweet: (https://twitter.com/benmmurphy/status/613733887211139072) 'does
Read the rest
anyone know a CA that signs directly from their root certs or has intermediate certs in trust stores? asking for a friend.' and apparently there are some CAs that will do this. in the case of hex i think the chain you need to create looks something like this: RANDOM CERT SIGNED BY ISSUER NOT IN TRUST STORE | V VALID_CERT_SIGNED_BY_CERT_IN_TRUST_STORE (effectively treated as CA bit set) | V EVIL CERTIFICATE SIGNED BY PREVIOUS CERT
In OpenSSL Security Advisory

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