UACME

Interesting. If that’s possible (I haven’t tested it, but I’m sure it is) then you wouldn’t even need to log the password. You could just alias sudo to a bash script that runs your malicious payload using the real sudo. Then the user would run the command, be prompted for their password by the real sudo, and be none the wiser that a malicious script has just been executed For what it’s worth, Windows’ security model says it’s not an exploit that programs can grant themselves admin rights if the user is an admin (https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME). But afaik Linux doesn’t have that model so it is a bit of an issue that this is possible

> At least, not without intentionally opting into it. just to clarify in Windows, users with administrative privileges will in theory still ask the user to opt-in every time before any process is elevated to administrative rights. Its just that Windows security is so awful that people have found many different creative ways around it over the years, but those are (sometimes) getting patched by Microsoft so they are considered "bugs". For example a process stores its executable path in memory writable by itself, so you could start a process that replaces its executable string to "C:\Windows\explorer.exe" and it would (for whatever reason) bypass the "ask for administrative rights" dialog popup. This is the sort of "security" that Windows is built around to its very core. https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME > "This tool shows ONLY popular UAC

There's some very good points in there, but (4) is unfair. It's true that there's no boundary between a sudoer and root in Linux, but there's also no boundary between an Administrator and SYSTEM in Windows. UAC, even in the "secure" AlwaysNotify mode which uses the secure desktop, has countless unpatched bypasses[1]. Also, (3) should raise some eyebrows for readers paying attention. Cool, Microsoft removed font parsing from the kernel, how wise of them. Wait a second, why was font parsing in the kernel to begin with? With win32k.sys, it shouldn't be surprising that Microsoft has to do more legwork to bring the attack surface back down to the level of other OSes. They're also exploring the use of eBPF in the Windows kernel too[2]. [1]: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME [2]: https://github.com/Microsoft/ebpf-for-windows

Unfortunately, the "UAC is not a security boundary" meme bears repeating here. There are many similar such UAC bypasses, e.g. https://github.com/rootm0s/WinPwnage#uac-bypass-techniques and https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME.

Yes. UAC was not really designed as a security boundary in the first place. Here are some public exploits for it: https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME

UAC is arguably better than nothing but: it was designed to run at max level (the only available one in Vista, where it was introduced). Because the UX hindrance was too high MS added intermediate levels, but without evolving the whole design from a security model point of view. The result is so weak that MS simultaneously started to declare that UAC is not a security boundary, so they don't have to include comprehensive fixes in each security patch, only partial ones in system upgrades, when they feel like it. https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME currently references 8 unfixed bypasses. That's so high that I don't think this is reserved for targeted infection; it might very well happen in common malware.

They also broke the security on the default configuration because now you can just interact with the system components to bypass UAC, see e.g. [0]. This is officially not a security vulnerability because UAC isn't actually a security barrier unless you set it to "Always prompt", but just a feature to make applications play nice. But note that it's not on "Always prompt" by default... [0] https://github.com/hfiref0x/UACME