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indutny
elliptic
JavaScript2014–2026
indutny / elliptic

elliptic

Fast Elliptic Curve Cryptography in plain javascript

Web DevelopmentSecurity & Privacy
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
7Distinct people
9Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.8KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Fast Elliptic Curve Cryptography in plain javascript

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year9 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2014-05-25 17:48:18 UTC to 2026-01-08 05:39:31 UTC.

012342014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments20142015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

9 sources
bartbutler·Apr 25, 2019
We are aware of the the issues brought up in [0] and [1]. As suggested in [2], we are already considering to switch to an implementation in WebAssembly to mitigate the possibility of timing attacks on the web platform. In our mobile and desktop apps, where timing attack resistance is easier to achieve, the X25519 implementation is already constant-time. Once they are generated, keys are controlled by our users and not easily updated, so we wanted to make our choice of default curve as future-proof as we could while balancing speed and interoperability. [0]: https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/issues/128 [1]: https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=861639#10 [2]: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/issues/720
In ProtonMail now offers elliptic curve cryptography
KirinDave·Apr 25, 2019
This announcement is an example of why I am not using ProtonMail anymore. There are a lot of things they do that sound very good on marketing materials, but upon examination are security theater. For example, they claim, "We have chosen a particular elliptic curve system known as X25519, which is fast, secure, and particularly resistant to timing attacks. It’s simple to implement". However, previously they've said that they use Indutny's library [0]. This library is somewhat infamous because its leadership deciding to discard any pretense of defending against timing attacks on the grounds that would make the library "too slow." [1] There are other options. They could have used something with good timing attack resistance from WebCrypto. Those options exist. Folks with more skill than I have recommended P-256 as an option. [0]: https://pro
Read the rest
tonmail.com/blog/openpgpjs-3-release/ [1]: https://github.com/indutny/elliptic/issues/128#issuecomment-...
In ProtonMail now offers elliptic curve cryptography

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