intel-cmt-cat

Intel's RDT stack has that in the form of CAT (Cache Allocation Technology) and MBA (Memory Bandwidth Allocation). Some more advanced HFT shops use that extensively https://github.com/intel/intel-cmt-cat

There are lots of things browsers can do to mitigate this, but it requires a change from the simplistic worldview of trusting a random websites javascript and assuming a software emulator won't reveal information about the host. If this paper finally prompts more concern about side channel attacks that would be great. Thing they could do include: - running the javascript engine on a specific core and evicting other processes from that core, which is a common technique in real time systems (pinning and isolating); - hardware cache partitioning, then locking PTEs and TLBs for that core (eg Intel xCAT); - separate websites by levels of trust, and run less trusted code more conservatively. Time monotonicity can be preserved without enabling high resolution linearity. (Intel CAT hasn't made it to the kernel mainline yet, nearly though. https:/

> 1) Modern hardware is getting much better at multiplexing resources (aka "making the things play nice with each other"). See for example sr-iov. sorry, but with sr-iov, you still have one single 'control' application muxing resources for applications sitting above it. for example, with dpdk, you more or less take over the complete network card. the 'control' might be even human in some cases :) which/who carefully lays out the resource mapping. another example, intel's cmt/cat techniques (https://github.com/01org/intel-cmt-cat/wiki) map nic's rx/tx rings to processors l3 cache etc. this is ofcourse assuming that userland applications have complete control over pci-e lanes etc. now, if you have two such control applications e.g. one doing packet-io and the other doing disk-io, how do you ensure that these control applications don't starv