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intel
Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files
Systems & Infrastructure2019–2026
intel / Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files

Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files

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13Distinct people
13Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
834GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 11:56:56 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year13 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-10-29 12:39:31 UTC to 2026-05-25 04:43:02 UTC.

012342019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

13 sources
They have been partially reversed and ==maybe== definitely cracked, but it doesn't matter. The web or chain of trust of those updates from the vendor to the processor is what matters. They're at least CRC checked to prevent loading corrupt files. Intel microcode update secret key revealed https://arstechnica.com/gadgets/2020/10/in-a-first-researche... https://ieeeaccess.ieee.org/featured-articles/reverseenginee... https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat... https://github.com/platomav/CPUMicrocodes It would take state actor-level effort to install APTs as firmware or microcode updates. Microcode updates are the smallest target because they don't survive power outages. Attacking the TPM, BIOS, SSD, accessory ICs, or supply chain would be more useful.
In On “I don't trust microcode” (2021)
> How bad is this exactly? 7.1 out of 10 https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advi... This was part of IPU 2021.2 in November and other bugs in other CPUs were fixed as well, one rated 8.2 affecting many, but not all, intel cpus (intel-sa-00562). If you haven't updated your UEFI/BIOS since last November and you love to run untrusted code by untrusted third parties on your CPU, the larger story about microcode bugs and privilege escalation into the management engine is bad and best fixed keeping up to date with microcode updates. Please note that the IPU 2021.2 fixes are not runtime loadable: https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat... and require an UEFI/BIOS update. The concrete story is mostly about a problem with the Atom line, which allowed code execution in the IME and a full dump of it. Very in
Read the rest
teresting for nerds that want to hack into that for reasons of taking ownership of what they bought, less interesting for malware, but not irrelevant. The link is about the Chip Red Pill Team giving a talk about how they broke the Atom and what intel hides inside. It is a good talk by people who have years of experience cracking open Intels chips. I can recommend it to anyone who cares about that. From a news perspective however it is three month old, if we ignore the zero nights russia talk in September ;-)
In Chip Red Pill: Arbitrary [Micro]Code Execution Inside Intel Atom CPUs
Thankfully I do save all of the microcodes, so I can just use an early version by simply rebuilding the initramfs. I also hold that package back on Arch, so it does not get upgraded. Might want to look for them here: https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat... As to how to actually use those files to get your "intel-ucode.img", just take a look at: https://archlinux.org/packages/extra/any/intel-ucode/ For the "iucode_tool": https://gitlab.com/iucode-tool/iucode-tool/-/wikis/home The actual PKGBUILD for it on Arch Linux: https://github.com/archlinux/svntogit-packages/blob/packages... --- cd Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-Files-microcode-${pkgver/./} rm -f intel-ucode{,-with-caveats}/list mkdir -p kernel/x86/microcode iucode_tool --write-earlyfw=intel-ucode.img intel-ucode{,-with-caveats}/ The above gives
Read the rest
you "intel-ucode.img". Copy it to "/boot/". Run "mkinitcpio -p linux" or the like.
In Your CPU may have slowed down on Wednesday
It isn't clear if Haswell has this optimization. As an easy test you could run the zero-fill-bench linked in the post and check the fill0 vs fill1 numbers. If they are the same, Haswell probably never had this optimization in the first place. Based on the Intel microcode release note [1] it doesn't seem like client HSW got any update this time, only HSX (Haswell Xeon). --- [1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat...
In Your CPU may have slowed down on Wednesday
> > according to Intel, it happened only when the microcode was loaded by the kernel; they probably had tested only loading it from the firmware > I followed the Spectre situation quite closely, and never heard anything along those lines. Do you have a source? Sure, it was this one: https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat... "Intel identified an issue when OS loading microcode update revision 0xDC for cpuid 406E3 and 506E3. The microcode update has been reverted to revision 0xD6. This issue does not affect the microcode update when loaded from BIOS."
In Grub2 security update renders system unbootable
> When there's a bug in the CPU microcode, you're at the mercy of your motherboard vendor to release a new system BIOS that will update it for you—you can't just go to some download link at AMD and apply a fix yourself. At least on Linux, that's not true. Intel publishes microcode updates on Github [1] (and distros package it) and AMD has it upstreamed in linux-firmware [2], so you don't have to rely on motherboard vendors at all. [1] https://github.com/intel/Intel-Linux-Processor-Microcode-Dat... [2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/firmware/lin...
In A months-old AMD microcode bug destroyed my weekend

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