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kpcyrd
pacman-bintrans
Rust2021–2022
kpcyrd / pacman-bintrans

pacman-bintrans

Experimental pacman integration for Reproducible Builds and Binary Transparency (with sigstore/rekor)

6Distinct people
16Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
85GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Experimental pacman integration for Reproducible Builds and Binary Transparency (with sigstore/rekor)

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 6:28:55 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month16 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2021-08-23 15:34:38 UTC to 2022-11-01 18:54:10 UTC.

012342021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 2 submissions, 2 commentsAug 20212021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsMar 20222022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsNov 2022

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Aug 20212021-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC422
Sep 20212021-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Oct 20212021-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Nov 20212021-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Dec 20212021-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Feb 20222022-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Mar 20222022-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20222022-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20222022-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Jun 20222022-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20222022-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20222022-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20222022-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20222022-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20222022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
One way to mitigate that is through Binary Transparency, which would allow people to detect if a release is made for which there is no source code available (assuming the project already has reproducible builds). There is already a project attempting this for Arch Linux packages[0]. Of course it's still possible that an update could be sent to everyone which contains some code that only runs when a certain username is entered, so users would need to avoid updating the app until an audit by a trusted third party had approved it. [0] https://github.com/kpcyrd/pacman-bintrans
In Show HN: We built an end-to-end encrypted alternative to Google Photos
> Of course, since these packages are built automatically without human supervision it’s likely that some of them will have bugs in them that would otherwise have been caught by the maintainer. Human supervision isn't enough to protect the supply chain, and I can't think of a time that it's actually stopped an attack at the packaging stage, but having some extra "friction" in the process seems like it should be a benefit. Ideally an attacker would have to get past both the upstream author and the Debian maintainer, rather than these being two separate single points of failure. Fortunately the Debian project is improving the situation with regards to supply chain attacks by continuing to work on Reproducible Builds. I think the next step from there needs to be Binary Transparency, with the adoption of the sort of approach being trialled
Read the rest
In Thousands of Debian packages updated from their upstream Git repository

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