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kristapsdz
acme-client-portable
C2017–2019
kristapsdz / acme-client-portable · Archived

acme-client-portable

portable version of acme-client, a secure ACME client

Security & Privacy
Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
6Distinct people
6Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
101GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

portable version of acme-client, a secure ACME client

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 12:45:45 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month6 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-02-01 05:40:27 UTC to 2019-02-12 04:51:31 UTC.

012342017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 3 submissions, 1 commentsFeb 20172017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsFeb 20182018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsFeb 2019

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 20172017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC431
Mar 20172017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20172017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20172017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20172017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20172017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20172017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20172017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20172017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20172017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20172017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20182018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20182018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20182018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20182018-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20182018-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20182018-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Aug 20182018-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20182018-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20182018-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20182018-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20182018-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20192019-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-03-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
aexaey·Feb 2, 2017
OP is understandably upset about seccomp filters not being portable between different distributions and architectures. Fair enough. But there's another glaring issue here. This app's seccom filter was written by a fairly security-conscious developer, who goes as far as saying he'd ideally want to reproduce any bug reports involving filter changes, and have serious unease accepting patches with new "allow" statements blindly. In other words, we can consider this seccomp filter to be as good as it gets, or close. And yet, this filter allows[1]: - Full network access (socket/connect/bind/recvfrom/sendto); - Full local file-system access (open/read/write/close/mmap/unlink/rename); - Access to a long-time vulnerable system call that was only fixed relatively recently, i.e. probably fix still isn't applied on quite a number of systems out there
Read the rest
(madvise) [2]. That's plenty of rope, if you ask me. How one could argue that process having all of permissions above is "sandboxed" in any meaningful way? [1] https://github.com/kristapsdz/acme-client-portable/blob/mast... [2] https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=12756006
In Why acme-client-portable (Lets's Encrypt client) doesn't enable seccomp on Linux

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