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kstenerud
yoloai
Go2026–2026
kstenerud / yoloai

yoloai

Your agent is a security risk, so treat it like one. yoloAI does AI agent sandboxing right.

4Distinct people
52Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
255GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Your agent is a security risk, so treat it like one. yoloAI does AI agent sandboxing right.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

Claude Code's "Don't Ask Again" exposes passwords in 1,122 public GitHub files direct repository linkDebated

The discussion centers on whether Claude Code's 'Don't Ask Again' feature is at fault for leaking secrets into public repositories or if the issue stems entirely from user negligence in committing local settings files. Conversely, defenders argue that manual review is fundamentally unsustainable at scale and that the industry must shift toward automated approval or robust sandboxing despite current flaws.

429 readable replies · Supporting reply 1 · Supporting reply 2 · Supporting reply 3 · Supporting reply 4

Mentions over time

HN mentions by week52 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-02-25 20:23:05 UTC to 2026-08-20 10:59:24 UTC. Weeks start Monday, UTC.

024682026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsFeb 232026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 1 submissions, 5 comments2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 commentsMay 182026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 0 submissions, 8 comments2026-07-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-07-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-03 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-08-03 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-10 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-08-10 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-17 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2026-08-17 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-24 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsAug 17

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 232026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC202
Mar 22026-03-02 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC101
Mar 92026-03-09 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC615
Mar 162026-03-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC202
Mar 232026-03-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC606
Mar 302026-03-30 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 62026-04-06 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC303
Apr 132026-04-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 202026-04-20 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 272026-04-27 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC000
May 42026-05-04 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC000
May 112026-05-11 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC000
May 182026-05-18 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC404
May 252026-05-25 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jun 12026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC303
Jun 82026-06-08 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC404
Jun 152026-06-15 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 222026-06-22 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC303
Jun 292026-06-29 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC101
Jul 62026-07-06 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC101
Jul 132026-07-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-20 00:00:00 UTC808
Jul 202026-07-20 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 272026-07-27 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-03 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 32026-08-03 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-10 00:00:00 UTC101
Aug 102026-08-10 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-17 00:00:00 UTC303
Aug 172026-08-17 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-24 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

52 sources
The rule I set for linting when an LLM is writing code is: Either you adhere to the rules, or you mark an exception with a valid reason. https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai/blob/main/docs/contribut... Poor defaults break systems by a thousand cuts. They seem to make sense when designing the language (more convenient, less typing, etc), but then they very quickly become liabilities as project complexity increases. Go made the mistakes of mutable-by-default and silent-error-dropping, but their cyclical-import-forbidding was a good call.
In Go is an ideal language for AI-assisted software engineering
I wrote one that has both of those: yoloAI (MIT, Go, single binary, no login). https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai Outbound firewall is `--network-isolated`: egress is denied except the agent's own API endpoints plus domains you allow, enforced sandbox-side (working on host-side enforcement now). `--network-none` if you want nothing. Credential brokering works the way you describe (currently Claude-only, I'll add more as time allows). The API key stays on the host, a local proxy injects it into the outbound request, and the sandbox never holds anything worth stealing. Other agents' credentials currently arrive as read-only file mounts instead (weaker, and something I'll fix soon). Generalising the injector is the obvious next thing. One difference from your setup: yoloAI copies your worktree instead of mounting it. The agent works on the
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copy, you `yoloai diff`, and `yoloai apply` replays the commits into your real repo. That's deliberate. Docker's own security docs talk about the dangers of bombs being left behind in a live-mounted dir (git hooks, package.json scripts, Makefiles, IDE task config), which diff/apply avoids. Isolation is per-sandbox rather than fixed: runc, gVisor, or Kata VMs (QEMU or Firecracker) on Linux; Seatbelt or full macOS VMs via Tart on a Mac.
In Docker Sandboxes – Disposable, isolated sandboxes for AI agents
I am developing a project that makes running in Apple Container (Docker is an alternate runtime for Linux) more convenient: https://github.com/gregwebs/claude-contained/ It blocks network access by default, mounts only what you specify, and you can add a customization layer. This is all done in the container itself (srt for network blocking). It doesn't implement a central point for secret sharing, MCP exposure, etc. So it might not have enough features for some but it works well for my needs. I just found through this thread yoloai which has an apple container backend, so its quite similar using that. My main issue would be that network access is allowed by default. https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai Several other projects listed here use libkrun which is an alternate implementation that works with Mac's HVF. smolvm, microsandbox, podma
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n (with likrun backend), gondolin.
In Docker Sandboxes – Disposable, isolated sandboxes for AI agents
Permission prompts is a TERRIBLE model, and never should have existed. This is one of the reasons that led to the development of yoloAI: - No permission prompts. The agent has free reign and never has to ask permission, but is in a sandbox. - Sandbox on Linux using Docker, Podman, containerd, gVisor, Kata, Firecracker - Sandbox on Mac using Docker (Docker Desktop or Orbstack), Podman, Apple containers, Seatbelt, Tart (Tart lets you run simulators). - Network control - Secrets control (file mounts or credentials broker) - NO ambient data (ENV is replaced with a minimal and local-to-sandbox one) - NO access to your homedir. You have to explicitly mount things you want. - NO direct access to your workdir: You can get a diff of the changes the agent made, and then choose whether to apply them. - gitignored files never get copied in. The agent
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never sees them. - FOSS https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
In Humans missed 1 in 3 threats approving AI agent commands across 40k game runs
I've already explained in some sister comments. Sandboxing is one of those things that seems very simple on the surface, and is EXTREMELY complicated once you start actually digging into the implications, gotchas, and security issues. The underlying tools were never designed with this use case in mind, so they need a little help to reach that last mile. And this glue is where all the chaos ensues. Here's a small sample of the crazy shit you have to deal with: https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai/blob/main/docs/contribut... And that's if you're actually following the proper procedures (which are themselves byzantine and tricky to get right).
In I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
I designed it to provide a single interface to agent sandboxing, no matter how far up the security tower you want to go. It eliminates the manual process steps you end up doing with an ad-hoc system (which gets old the 10th time you do it). Common weak points: - The agent can access your homedir. - The agent can access .gitignored files, which can contain secrets (and are gitignored for this reason). - The agent has r/w access to your workdir. - The agent could follow your remote mounted dirs. - The agent can act in your name with whatever credentials it finds (and it will use them when it tries to be helpful, especially with the gh tool). - Do you even know what's in the diagnose_problem.sh file it just created and asked permission to run? - Even the .git dir can be weaponized, such as with evil filters. - The agent can edit its own proc
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ess, bypassing the harness controls and giving it the same access as you have (amplified by each credential sitting on that machine). Meanwhile, you're reflex-hitting ENTER without looking because 99% of the permission prompts are mundane. And that's before you even get to all of the idiosyncrasies in the backends that will eventually trip you up. The list is quite large and continually growing: https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai/blob/main/docs/contribut...
In I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
Sandboxing is a VERY HARD problem. I've been working on it for months, and finally have something that's mostly there: - Sandbox on Linux using Docker, Podman, containerd, gVisor, Kata, Firecracker - Sandbox on Mac using Docker (Docker Desktop or Orbstack), Podman, Apple containers, Seatbelt, Tart (Tart lets you run simulators). - Network control - Secrets control (file mounts or credentials broker) - NO ambient data (ENV is replaced with a minimal and local-to-sandbox one) - NO access to your homedir. You have to explicitly mount things you want. - NO direct access to your workdir: Your work dir is never modified until you apply the changes, either standalone or as a git commit. You can also diff before applying. Git runs sandbox side in case the repo has filters. - gitignored files never get copied in. The agent never sees them. - Has b
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uilt-in support for claude, codex, gemini, aider, and opencode, but you can also launch it in "shell" mode and run whatever you want. - Supports VS code tunnels, so you can remotely access in VS code if you don't want to use the terminal. - Full lifecycle support: Launch, attach, stop, restart, wait, one-shot, clone, destroy - MCP passthrough - Layered API (golang) if you want to sandbox other things - Self-contained binary. No external requirements other than the backends you want to use. Defaults to a ~/.yoloai dir for config/data, but you can point it anywhere. - FOSS https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
In I tricked Claude into leaking your deepest, darkest secrets
I built yoloAI for this kind of nightmare scenario (among others). - The sandboxed agent has no access to your homedir, or ANY dir on your machine except what you explicitly give it access to. - Even with your workdir, it honors .gitignore and refuses to copy in any ignored paths to the sandbox copy. - The sandboxed agent doesn't have access to your ENV (unless you explicitly pass things through one-by-one). - Networking can be restricted any way you like. - Credentials are proxied (currently Claude only), so the agent has access to NO secrets at all. - You pick the security backend to match your needs (containers, VMs, etc). - It's FOSS. https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
In Grok CLI uploaded the whole home directory to GCS
yoloAI does something similar: - Sandbox on Linux using Docker, Podman, containerd, gVisor, Kata, Firecracker - Sandbox on Mac using Docker (Docker Desktop or Orbstack), Podman, Apple containers, Seatbelt, Tart (Tart lets you run simulators). - Network restriction - Secrets control (file mounts or credentials broker) - NO ambient data (ENV is replaced with a minimal and local-to-sandbox one, no host-side filesystem access beyond what you explicitly allow) - Workdir protection: Your work dir is never modified until you apply the changes, either standalone or as a git commit. You can also diff before applying. Git runs SANDBOX side in case the repo has filters. - Uses copy-on-write if your filesystem supports it (most modern ones do) - Has built-in support for claude, codex, gemini, aider, and opencode, but you can also launch it in "shell"
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mode and run whatever you want. - Supports VS code tunnels, so you can remotely access in VS code if you don't want to use the terminal. - Full lifecycle support: Launch, attach, stop, restart, wait, one-shot, clone, destroy - MCP passthrough - Layered API (golang) if you want to sandbox other things - Self-contained binary. No external requirements other than the backends you want to use. Defaults to a ~/.yoloai dir for config/data, but you can point it anywhere. - FOSS https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
In Show HN: Clawk – Give coding agents a disposable Linux VM, not your laptop
I made a tool that creates sandboxes (docker, podman, orbstack, seatbelt, tart, Apple containers, containerd, kata, firecracker) and then sets up an agent (claude, codex, gemini, aider, opencode) inside it with max permissiveness (no prompts to call sed, etc). It creates a CoW copy of your workdir for the agent to play in, and then you pull changes out using git diff/apply semantics. You control network access, secrets, which files/dirs it has access to. It's a MASSIVE time saver, and I use it as my daily driver. https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
In Ask HN: What Are You Working On? (July 2026)
The biggest public thing I'm working on is an AI sandbox tool that keeps it separated from your system and secrets. Changes the AI makes to the "workdir" are extracted via diffs or git commits, so you can see what the AI did before deciding if you want it or not. It has no access to your home dir, no access to your env, and you can restrict its network access. Containment can be container or VM level, with a Linux or MacOS contained environment. https://github.com/kstenerud/yoloai
In Ask HN: What are you working on? (July 2026)

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