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kubernetes
enhancements
Go2016–2026
kubernetes / enhancements

enhancements

Enhancements tracking repo for Kubernetes

53Distinct people
58Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
4KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Enhancements tracking repo for Kubernetes

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 7:27:27 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year58 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-08-19 23:02:27 UTC to 2026-05-09 20:50:55 UTC.

0369122016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 0 submissions, 8 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 11 mentions; 2 submissions, 9 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 2 submissions, 5 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC808
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1129
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC725
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

5 sources
Make sure you are at least using user namespaces which drop the mknod cap by their nature, or better yet in rootless mode. I have filed several bugs that I know can result in breakout but as I can't make myself disclose vulnerabilities I have no stick to get them to change their 'wont fix' decisions. k8s doesn't support user namespaces let alone user mount namespaces. Here is the open issue. https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/127 The point being that for k8s and docker, any role that allows you to create pods/containers or to compromise such a role with any hop number should be considered as having root permissions. While I won't share any non-privileged breakouts, here is an example of how easy it is with the --privileged flag. https://stackoverflow.com/questions/36425230/privileged-cont... While I am not recommending it i
Read the rest
n general, AppArmor is fairly easy to develop CI friendly restrictions with and I would strongly suggest you protect the directory space and devices that you don't use with it. Not perfect but it typically can help prevent leaks caused by adding features or configuration errors. Runc using seccomp to make a container process make the one-way transition into a "secure" state and through dropped capabilities is what provides additional security. Hiding pids doesn't matter when any container can list /dev or look through /sys and /proc to find device major and minor numbers or to modify kernel parameters or files that are mistakenly given write access. The overwriting of the runc executable CVE that recently happened will give an actual case there. Namespaces are more about decoupling and avoiding pollution than security. Just like chroot, the shared kernel instance has a large attack surface, especially if you don't leverage all of the tools provided. As you are effectively running arbitrary code from users, I would highly suggest you look into non container runtime protection. It can be made reasonably safe but an overconfidence in containers being inherently secure will make you a target. If you are on k8s you should be using anti-affinity or taints to make sure containers running external user code is not running on the same nodes as other containers or better than that have a dedicated k8s for that need. Especially if you have persistent storage as user mount point namespaces are new in the kernel and default mounts typically are implemented by granting CAP_SYS_ADMIN capabilities(7)
In Why we run Data Pipelines as Containers
The first issue you've linked concerns quota support for ephemeral storage requests/limits - which is not about the limits themselves, but the ability to set a limit quotas per tenant/namespace. Eg., team A cannot use a total of more than 100G ephemeral storage in total in the cluster. EDIT: No, sorry, it's about using underlying filesystem quotas for limiting ephemeral storage, vs. the current implementation, see the third point below. Also see KEP: https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/tree/master/keps/... The second is a tracking issue for a KEP that has been implemented but is still in alpha/beta. This will be closed when all the related features are stable. There's also some discussion about related functionality that might be added as part of this KEP/design. The third issue is about integrating Docker storage quotas with Kuber
Read the rest
netes ephemeral quotas - ie., translating ephemeral storage limits into disk quotas (which would result in -ENOSPC to workloads), vs. the standard kubelet implementation which just kills/evicts workloads that run past their limit. I agree these are difficult to understand if you're not familiar with the k8s development/design process. I also had to spend a few minutes on each one of them to understand what the actual state of the issues is. However, they're in a development issue tracker, and the end-user k8s documentation clearly states that Ephemeral Storage requests/limits works, how it works, and what its limitations are: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/configuration/manage-res...
In Treat Kubernetes clusters as cattle, not pets
> Kubernetes has the concept of limits, especially on ephemeral storage So... why are these issues open? https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/1029 https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/361 https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/issues/54384 > additionally: if your node becomes unhealthy then the workloads would be rescheduled on another node. Well of course, but you're going to run into that issue (likely) on all of the nodes where the offending service lives. > But let’s not argue things that aren’t true. If what I've said is untrue, looking at open GitHub issues and the Kubernetes documentation is certainly no indication. That's a massive problem all by itself.
In Treat Kubernetes clusters as cattle, not pets
Almost all container breakout concerns rely on running containers as a privileged user: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/53024790/kubernetes-supp... There is an issue that I've been tracking, and there has been a new PR that will hopefully land soon to implement this in Kubernetes in a simplified manner: https://github.com/kubernetes/enhancements/issues/127 As for whether security policies prevent breakouts, it really depends on what the exploit is but they can significantly help. The idea of user namespace remapping solves a secondary issue though... if there is a breakout, what user privileges will they have.
In Containers are tents

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