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lavabit
magma
C2017–2026
lavabit / magma

magma

The magma server daemon, is an encrypted email system with support for SMTP, POP, IMAP, HTTP and MOLTEN,. Additional support for DMTP and DMAP is currently in active development.

8Distinct people
8Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.8KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

The magma server daemon, is an encrypted email system with support for SMTP, POP, IMAP, HTTP and MOLTEN,. Additional support for DMTP and DMAP is currently in active development.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year8 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-01-20 22:32:01 UTC to 2026-02-14 01:20:53 UTC.

01232017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

8 sources
>scanning a c project for buffer overflows is relatively trivial compared to scanning tons of libraries for flaws so obfuscated they made it through review You would have to scan the C project for buffer overflows and memory leaks in addition to scanning the tons of C libraries that it uses[0] for buffer overflows and memory leaks (note that openssl is in that list, among other massive libs). This is not even taking logic errors into account. There is simply too much to consider all at once, and being in C just makes it that much harder have a reasonable sense of security. You're also implying that it's easier to spot intentionally backdoored C than intentionally backdoored Python, Go, Java, etc, but I have no reason to believe that that's true. Furthermore, the number of eyes that have been on those projects is far higher than the number
Read the rest
of eyes that will ever grace Magma. [0] https://github.com/lavabit/magma/tree/develop/lib/archives
In Magma – An encrypted email server daemon
There's a difference-- point-to-point encryption is what you're talking about. Anytime a message is transferred, it's done via TLS, but you can't be guaranteed that at any one point the message is kept encrypted. You can have this today -- just about any MTA has a configuration to only allow TLS connections, and then you can set up an IMAP server to only allow encrypted connections. End-to-end encryption is the system whereby the moment the message leaves the sender's hands (phone, desktop, whatever) it's encrypted until it gets into the receiver's hands. This is your OpenPGP/etc. You could think of that as "Signal for email". This is apparently not what Magma is doing. Here's the relevant line from Github: https://github.com/lavabit/magma/blob/develop/src/providers/... You can see that Magma is writing the email message to a file and ins
Read the rest
tructing ClamAV to scan the file. This is actually worse than writing to a clamd socket, since (imho) it would be easier for someone to monitor a directory in a filesystem on a compromised Magma server. Compare this to how SpamAssassin communicates with ClamAV-- it streams to either the port or socket: https://wiki.apache.org/spamassassin/ClamAVPlugin
In Magma – An encrypted email server daemon

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