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letsencrypt
acme-spec
Learning & Reference2014–2017
letsencrypt / acme-spec

acme-spec

ACME Specification

14Distinct people
14Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

ACME Specification

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 2:59:53 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year14 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2014-11-18 17:57:15 UTC to 2017-07-06 17:42:58 UTC.

02462014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20142015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 1 submissions, 6 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2017

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC716
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

3 sources
What verification strategy are they using to determine when a wildcard cert can be created? I see the discussion on https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/issues/64 suggesting that they validate a sampling of randomly-generated subdomains, but it's unclear if that's actually the strategy they're using (and an obvious downside with that strategy is it won't work for a client that wants a wildcard cert for whatever reason but hasn't configured DNS to handle arbitrary subdomains, though you could of course argue that these clients don't actually need wildcard certs).
In Wildcard Certificates Coming January 2018
> Why wouldn't it check all of them? If I request a certificate for "* .github.com", how do you propose that Let's Encrypt check all of the infinitely-many possible subdomains? > Why would requesting a wildcard for a subdomain (i.e. pas.github.com) give me a cert that works for the root domain (i.e. github.com)? The issue here is that it's only safe to issue a wildcard certificate to someone who already has full control over all of the domains covered by the wildcard, now and in the future. This is impossible to prove using only an HTTP challenge-response. For example, let's say an attacker requests a wildcard certificate for "* .github.io". Hypothetically, LE could say: "OK, to prove that you control all possible subdomains, place a particular nonce at http://e9cd20b9c359939c.github.io/.well-known/acme-challenge... Our attacker quickly r
Read the rest
egisters the username "e9cd20b9c359939c" on Github, satisfies the challenge, and gets a cert that allows them to impersonate other Github users. Alternatively, you could require validation of "github.io" itself, and say that anyone with control over the top-level domain is assumed to be authorized to get wildcard certs as well. But this weakens security for everyone else. For example, Google probably wouldn't be happy if a compromise of their search engine at "google.com" was escalated to a compromise of "accounts.google.com" which handles user sign-in. These aren't fundamentally unsolvable problems, but there are enough edge cases that the ACME folks decided to postpone wildcards until all the details can be carefully figured out. See https://github.com/letsencrypt/acme-spec/pull/97 for some of the messy details.
In ACME v2 API Endpoint Coming January 2018

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