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linux-nvme
nvme-cli
C2017–2026
linux-nvme / nvme-cli

nvme-cli

NVMe management command line interface.

4Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.9KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

NVMe management command line interface.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 1:49:46 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-01-08 15:54:26 UTC to 2026-06-27 09:40:44 UTC.

0122017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211

What Hacker News says

4 sources
So many NVMe/SATA drives that are locked/frozen during boot, and it turns out this is because the drives are actually behaving incorrectly when "security operations" are blocked on the drive. When "security operations" are blocked, you should not be able to set a password on the drive, but should be able to format it. So that's bug 1. Most modern motherboards, on boot, will block "security operations" on a drive where the security password is set to the default (because it hasn't been manually set by the end-user). They do this to prevent malware from being able to set a password on a drive that hasn't had its password set. (Malware could set the password and I believe configure the drive to effectively brick it.) But many (probably most) motherboards fail to correctly block "security operations" on a suspend/resume. This is bug 2, and ma
Read the rest
kes suspend/resume often an effective workaround for a drive with bug 1, as well as a theoretical opportunity for malware to easily inflict damage on all drives that support "security operations". So one generally ends up stuck and unable to securely erase their drive when it has bug 1 and is installed on a motherboard without bug 2. In this case, you have to hope your motherboard has a feature in its BIOS to, on next boot, not block security operations. Otherwise you're stuck and need to find another motherboard if you want to sanitize your drive, or hope that a firmware update for your drive resolves bug 1. The full details are in this comment on a Github issue from 2016: https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli/issues/84#issuecommen... . It was one of the most rewarding bugs I've had the fortune to get to the bottom of. We were extra motivated to fully understand it when we moved to a new SSD benchmarking test system that turned out to not have bug 2: https://pcpartpicker.com/forums/topic/460000-an-ssd-that-can...
In How not to securely erase a NVME drive (2022)
The optimal block size is probably the the amount of data which can be transferred with one DMA operation. For NVMe disks on Linux, you can find out this size with the nvme-cli [0] tool. Use "nvme id-ctrl" to find the Maximum Data Transfer Size (MDTS) in disk (LBA) blocks and "nvme id-ns" to find the LBA Data Size (LBADS). The value is then 2^MDTS * 2^LBADS byte. For example, the Intel SSD 450 can transfer 32 blocks of 4096 byte per NVMe command, so you'd want a block size of 128 kiB. [0] https://github.com/linux-nvme/nvme-cli
In Dd is not a disk writing tool (2015)

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