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lunasec-io
lunasec
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lunasec-io / lunasec

lunasec

LunaSec - Dependency Security Scanner that automatically notifies you about vulnerabilities like Log4Shell or node-ipc in your Pull Requests and Builds. Protect yourself in 30 seconds with the LunaTrace GitHub App: https://github.com/marketplace/lunatrace-by-lunasec/

4Distinct people
39Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
1.5KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

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What it is

LunaSec - Dependency Security Scanner that automatically notifies you about vulnerabilities like Log4Shell or node-ipc in your Pull Requests and Builds. Protect yourself in 30 seconds with the LunaTrace GitHub App: https://github.com/marketplace/lunatrace-by-lunasec/

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What people are saying

Nit picking a bit but I prefer btrfs even if it's slower. Easier to work with. What bootloader is this using? Or is it just straight EFI booting? I helped write a guide a few…

freeqaz used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 5:04:15 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year39 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2021-11-01 15:24:34 UTC to 2024-09-14 21:35:23 UTC.

05101520252021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 2 submissions, 8 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 24 mentions; 1 submissions, 23 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1028
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC24123
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

24 sources
(Note: I'm the person that coined the term "Log4Shell") You may be surprised when I tell you what the Apache Software foundation's yearly budget is. You'd think for software that is used by practically every Fortune 500 company and most governments, it would be something reasonable. Maybe a few hundred million dollars a year to pay for a reasonable full-time staff, right? It turns out... it's about $2 million a year. (Wikipedia[0]) This helps explain to me why the devs of Log4j directly uploaded the file "JNDIExploit.java" (the POC) to GitHub while they were patching. (Here is a full analysis about what happened[1].) They're not security people. They're volunteers working on this in addition to their full-time job. What kind of brave soul wants to trudge through and maintain log4j in their spare time for zero compensation? I appreciate th
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e people that are capable of doing that, but I think they are rare! This whole entire vulnerability was eye opening for everybody and I have actually spent the last year building tooling on GitHub to help fix the problems that Log4Shell exposed. If you have 2 seconds to try that out or just Star the repo[2], it would be very helpful! 0: Log4j revenue https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Apache_Software_Foundation 1: "How to Discuss and Fix Vulnerabilities in Open Source" https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/how-to-mitigate-open-source... 2: GitHub project building better dependency patching tools https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec
In Log4Shell Still Has Sting in the Tail
This is a real problem that I believe will become increasingly commonly used by attackers to break into companies. Unfortunately, it's not an easy problem to automate the detection. There are some heuristics, but you're basically writing something like Norton Antivirus for Python packages lol. A sufficiently skilled attacker can make their code look totally innocent[0]. :) Source: Former security engineer at Uber/Snap that's now working on tooling in this space[1]. 0: "Underhanded C Competition" http://www.underhanded-c.org/ 1: Open Source "Supply Chain Security" platform https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec
In Detecting the use of “curl | bash” server side (2016)
It is possible to set your registry in NPM via the "npmrc" file. That will let you hit the specified HTTP server whenever you run commands like "npm install". I know this is also possible for Python because we did it at Uber. I don't remember the specific details anymore though. In either case though, a lot of people have written proxies for this use case (I helped write one for NPM at Uber). Companies like Bytesafe and Artifactory also exist in this space. We're working on something similar that's on GitHub here: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec Proxy support isn't built out yet but the data is all there already.
In Dozens of malicious PyPI packages discovered targeting developers
The current system is broken. I don't think I agree with everything in the post, but I'm excited to see movement in this space given that this is a space I spend a lot of time thinking about. (I'll expand on that below) Even if I disagree with parts of this, this is still one of the most interesting things that I've read around OSS licensing in a minute! Having actual VC money behind this movement is awesome. For context: I run an Open Source company that's YC + VC-backed. We use a hybrid of Apache and Business Source License (BSL, a "non-compete" license that converts to Apache in 2-3 years). Our license file[0] has context about my thought process around this, but I still am not totally happy with it. (BSL isn't an "OSI-Compatible" license, but feels like the "best compromise" license out there currently.) To come to that conclusion, I'
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ve read both Heather Meeker's book, "Open (Source) for Business"[1], multiple times now and I've also blogged about this topic[2] before. (She helped write the BSL license.) All of that is to say, it's complicated and there are some perverse incentives that can prevent you from always "doing the right thing". Problem #1: You lose control. You may begin with Apache but, as OP states, you eventually end up with the incentive to "rug pull" by switching the license because of market forces/VC influence. (I'm the founder of my company and I would resist it, but eventually our investors might control the board and make that happen anyway by firing me.) Problem #2: The hardest part of building a company is getting traction. Just getting anybody to care about you takes a ton of effort and having a permissive license makes it way easier to get that early adoption. And, by the time you have adoption and you decide to go raise VC money, you now end up with Problem #1. Problem #3: If you start with a copyleft license like GPL/AGPL then you make Problem #2 (adoption) harder. Many companies simply won't use your software if you're using a copyleft license (like Google). (Linux is a notable exception here, while companies like MongoDB switched from AGPL. It's crazy.) We are using BSL because it feels like the best compromise (it becomes Apache 2.0 eventually). I do still think a lot about switching to Apache though. I just really hate the idea of "rug pulling" and I'd rather be honest from the beginning with a license like BSL, even if it is more difficult to get that initial momentum. Does anybody else have thoughts to share about this? 0: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/blob/master/LICENSE.md 1: Open (Source) for Business: A Practical Guide to Open Source Software Licensing - Third Edition https://a.co/8SLjVZI 2: https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/how-to-build-an-open-source...
In Preventing the bait and switch by open core software companies
There are some techniques used mostly to detect when students copy paste code. I've seen some of the tools in that space and they have varying degrees of accuracy. MOSS is a common one[0]. There are some vendors in this space too (BlackDuck comes to mind) but they're $$$ so only within the scope of large corporations. If anybody has any ideas relating to this type of analysis, I'd be excited to chat. I am working on a project[1] in this space for "Software Composition Analysis" which could potentially overlap with snippet detection for code like Co-Pilot. (We basically just have a big pipeline of analysis jobs that run on code and store the results. I need to update the docs!) 0: https://yangdanny97.github.io/blog/2019/05/03/MOSS 1: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/tree/master/lunatrace
In GitHub Copi­lot inves­ti­ga­tion
Here is some code on GitHub that does call site checking using SemGrep: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/blob/master/lunatrace/... (Note: I helped write that. We're building a similar service to the r2c one.) You're right that patching is hard because of opaque package diffs. I've seen some tools coming out like Socket.dev which show a diff between versions. https://socket.dev/npm/package/react/versions But, that said, this is still a hard problem to solve and it's happened before that malware[0][1] has been silently shipped because of how opaque packages are. 0: https://web.archive.org/web/20201221173112/https://github.co... 1: https://www.coindesk.com/markets/2018/11/27/fake-developer-s...
In Ignore 98% of dependency alerts: introducing Semgrep Supply Chain
I have two thoughts to share about this from what you've said: > we must stop expecting [Open Source] devs to have any responsibility for code they produce. Yes, I agree with this. And something that's been in my head for a while, which often discussed, is how people often "magically think" something along the lines of: "If we just paid these devs for support, then we'd solve the support problem!" Unfortunately, I don't think is reality. If you're a dev working at Google and you toss a library on NPM, you probably can't be paid to support it because your employer forbids it. The type of person writing libraries Open Source is not always going to be motivated by money! > Some of my clients actually do (or pay others for) security review of every single NPM dependency they use in prod. If you can not afford to review 2000 dependencies then
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you can not afford 2000 dependencies. Find a leaner path. There was a post a few months ago[0] that has been talking about a way to "democratize" this review process. It's been sitting in my head and it's actually a part of a project that I'm working on now[1]. (My apologies for that not being documented anywhere yet though!) Essentially, if every company on this planet has to review every Open Source dependency, that's a massive waste of human effort because there is a ton of overlap between that work. Instead, what if you could have one person/entity do that work to review the dependencies and then you "buy" that dataset for a fraction of the price? If it takes 10 humans a year to review every dependency you have, then it's cheaper to pay 1 human salary to buy that data. (And we do the work once but then sell it 100+ times.) That's the core principle that's been in my head for a while and that's how we're trying to build a company right now. Unsexy problems aren't very "shiny" (like Stable Diffusion or NFTs) but they are important! 0: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32037562 1: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec
In There is no “software supply chain”
AWS CDK is pretty magical. The whole "constructs" that they have are very powerful. I was able to setup a scale-to-zero RDS Serverless database with an auto scaling backend using ECS + Fargate in a few hours. (With zero prior experience with the CDK) You can see that code here if you're curious: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/blob/master/lunatrace/... It's more complicated now but if you look at the history of that "backend-cdk" folder then it's simpler a few months ago. The important bit is the "ecs-patterns" library. That's the one that is magical and deals with setting up the load balancer, cluster, etc for you. And the way we shove the Docker images in I found to be quite straightforward. (And deploys are one line)
In Ask HN: How do you deploy your weekend project in 2022?
There are a few companies in this space that are trying to do the "Security Seal of Approval" thing to various degrees. Tidelift is one company that has a bunch of "catalogs"[0] of packages. I'm not sure how their package metadata is generated though -- maybe semi-manually? There is also Bytesafe[1] which is supposed to help give you a way to "firewall" yourself from unapproved dependencies. I don't think they sell data though. Just tools. A company based on the Open Source project, packj[2], is Ossilate[3] which is trying to use automated analysis for analyzing 3rd party packages. And another that's in this space is Socket.dev[4] which tries to warn you in your PRs about bad packages. I know about this space because I work on a project[5] that's also related to supply chain security. It's a bit different from all of the above since we're
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focused on patching known vulns, but the idea of "vetted packages" has crossed my mind before. Are there any other services in this space that I missed? 0: https://tidelift.com/solutions/catalogs 1: https://bytesafe.dev/ 2: https://github.com/ossillate-inc/packj 3: https://ossillate.com/ 4: https://socket.dev/ 5: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/
In Why has software supply chain security exploded?
Note: I run a vuln scanning company in this space (our GitHub[0]), so I can add some context to this. GitHub has this for Dependabot via CodeQL which is a part of their "Advanced Security" package. ($$$, ie "contact us", but I've heard ~$1-1.5k per dev per year roughly) Other big ones are SonaType, FOSSA, and Snyk (which OP mentioned). There are some smaller vendors too which I can add if anybody is curious. GitHub CodeQL is by far the best and their tech comes from their acquisition of Semmle/LGTM a few years ago. When I was at Uber, we used Semmle to augment the efforts of the bug bounty and to "scale" our AppSec team to keep up with an ever growing engineering team. The lack of flexibility with CodeQL and the other proprietary scanning tools is actually the reason why, when I decided to start a security company, I decided to center the
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company around building publicly on GitHub. It's harder to make money, at least initially, but it's also the "right" choice to actually push this industry forward. (The thought on how to make money is a hosted SaaS, of course.) Anyway, I'm happy to answer any questions around this stuff! 0: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec
In Vulnerability Management for Go
This is really cool to see because this is the #1 problem with current tools (as you said). I call it "alert fatigue" in my head because it's meaningless when you have 100+ vulns to fix but they're 99% unexploitable. I have a bit of a bone to pick with this space: I've been working on this problem for a few months now (link to repo[0] and blog[1]). My background is Application Security and, as is often the case with devs, rage fuels me in my desire to fix this space. Well, Log4Shell helped too. As another comment said, doing this in a language agnostic way is a big PITA and we haven't fully built it yet. We are using SemGrep to do very basic static analysis (see if vulnerable function is ever imported + called). But we're not doing fancy Inter-process taint analysis like CodeQL can. (We have a big Merkle tree that represents the dependenc
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y tree and that's how we are able to make the CI/CD check take only a few seconds because we can pre-compute.) Anyway, if you have a second to help, we have a GitHub App[2] that you can install to test this out + help us find bugs. It's best at NPM now but we have basic support for other languages (no dep tree analysis yet). There are so many edge cases with the ways that repos are setup so just have more scans coming in helps a ton. (Well, it breaks stuff, but we already determined that rage sustains me.) Thank you. climbs off of soap box 0: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec 1: https://www.lunasec.io/docs/blog/the-issue-with-vuln-scanner... 2: https://github.com/marketplace/lunatrace-by-lunasec
In Vulnerability Management for Go
I really dislike how overloaded the term "supply chain" is. I recently saw a "supply chain attack" on a Web3 company[0] and it turned out it was a contractor pushing malicious code. I've worked on "code provenance" professionally before[1] which is, apparently, a subset of "supply chain security". Specifically, I worked to help make sure that the code a dev committed was signed by their laptop, up through the CI, through the vuln scanners, and then the artifacts were verified before being deployed. It was a lot of work and it is it's own entire field (which is what the OP article is talking about). But now I'm also working on supply chain security[2] because I'm building tech to scan for vulns in dependencies (like NPM) by blocking known malicious packages or just enforcing security policies based on known vulns in them. How they are all
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bucketed under the same term, I don't know, and it hurts my soul. We need some better terms for this stuff. Anybody have any ideas? 0: https://ambcrypto.com/exec-issues-fbi-warning-as-sushiswaps-... 1: https://medium.com/uber-security-privacy/code-provenance-app... 2: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec
In A toolbox for a secure software supply chain
So I've actually spent about a year of my life working to solve this exact problem. Specifically: How do you prevent a single point of failure from leaking everything sensitive in a database. It turns out that it's a pain in the rear, but it's possible. You can read through the docs about the design on the site[0]. The parts that I haven't implemented yet, and that limit it's utility in production, are around searching the encrypted data (requires a second vault using asymmetric encryption) and some more in-depth disaster recovery (secure token recovery). Here is a link to the GitHub[1] for it all. 0: https://www.lunasec.io/docs/pages/lunadefend/overview/introd... 1: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/tree/master/lunadefend
In Supabase Vault
I wish that this article had focused more on the "how to" aspect of this problem and less on the "what" part. It feels a little muddied between trying to explain the problem space (researchers re-using code) and the "steps" involved (write clear code + docs, use Git). As somebody that runs a semi-popular Open Source project[0], I am very aware of the painstaking task of taking a "hacky script on my machine" and turning it into something public that others can not only use, but trust enough to _depend_ on too. Here is a rough checklist of tasks that come to mind: - Write a Readme with a description of what the project is (help Google index it for future search) - Publish a Docker image that can build the whole project and produce a binary or run the server (this is a massive PITA to get setup -- once you do this, setting up CI becomes very
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easy) - Ideally there is a Docker image with a small POC app too (which is often more useful that docs are imo) - Put the project into Awesome Lists so that people will actually find it (also helps with SEO) - Add a license to the repo and, if you really want people to trust it, add license headers to every file (I see _so many_ projects without even a LICENSE file. Without this, it's illegal to use the code at all!) Beyond all of that, Docs help a lot too, as does a "legit" looking website, but you can get away with pretty crappy docs if you do all of the above. 0: https://github.com/lunasec-io/lunasec/
In How to support open-source software and stay sane (2019)

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