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magento
magento2
PHP2013–2021
magento / magento2

magento2

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12Distinct people
16Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
12.2KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

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Prior to making any Submission(s), you must sign an Adobe Contributor License Agreement, available here at: https://opensource.adobe.com/cla.html. All Submissions you make to Adobe Inc. and its affiliates, assigns and subsidiaries (collectively “Adobe”) are subject to the terms of the Adobe Contributor License Agreement.

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Where it is used

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What people are saying

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Also in these discussions

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 5:58:02 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year16 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2013-11-21 17:54:45 UTC to 2021-04-07 11:48:09 UTC.

012342013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20132014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20132013-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20142014-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
Magento is incompetent on much simpler levels than this. 1. Someone thought chmod 777 was a good idea, ever, under any circumstances. Not only is this standard practice in Magento installs (it's a how-to step in many books on Magento), it's all through the actual codebase. The below is from the Magento Enterprise 1.14.0.1 tarball, downloaded from the company (and I double-checked this after someone questioned this last time I brought this up): $ grep -r chmod .|grep 777 ./downloader/lib/Mage/Backup/Filesystem.php: chmod($backupsDir, 0777); ./app/code/core/Mage/Compiler/Model/Process.php: @chmod($dir, 0777); ./app/code/core/Mage/Install/Model/Installer/Console.php: @chmod('var/cache', 0777); ./app/code/core/Mage/Install/Model/Installer/Console.php: @chmod('var/session', 0777); ./app/code/core/Mage/Install/Model/Installer/Config
Read the rest
.php: chmod($this->_localConfigFile, 0777); ./app/code/core/Mage/Catalog/Model/Product/Attribute/Backend/Media.php: $ioAdapter->chmod($this->_getConfig()->getTmpMediaPath($fileName), 0777); ./app/Mage.php: chmod($logDir, 0777); ./app/Mage.php: chmod($logFile, 0777); ./lib/Zend/Service/WindowsAzure/CommandLine/PackageScaffolder/PackageScaffolderAbstract.php: @chmod($path, '0777'); ./lib/Zend/Service/WindowsAzure/CommandLine/PackageScaffolder/PackageScaffolderAbstract.php: @chmod($path, 0777); ./lib/Zend/Service/WindowsAzure/CommandLine/PackageScaffolder/PackageScaffolderAbstract.php: @chmod($path, 0777); ./lib/Zend/Cloud/StorageService/Adapter/FileSystem.php: chmod($path, 0777); ./lib/Varien/Autoload.php: @chmod($this->_collectPath, 0777); ./lib/Varien/File/Uploader.php: chmod($destinationFile, 0777); ./lib/Mage/Backup/Filesystem.php: chmod($backupsDir, 0777); ./errors/processor.php: @chmod($this->_reportFile, 0777); 2. The company thinks there's nothing wrong with storing money as floats: https://github.com/magento/magento2/issues/555 The way we eventually dealt with hosting Magento (which we had strongly advised against) was a concrete sarcophagus and a thirty-kilometre exclusion zone: * a cron line specifically to remove o-w permissions from all files in the webroot every minute (which is very inelegant, but the alternative is maintaining our own patches to core). * Files not owned www-data, except where Magento must be able to write to them. * deploy all webroot files as a user the webserver can't write. * cron.sh (Magento's internal cron) runs as root out of the box. We ran it as www-data. * AppArmor to keep Magento from ever, ever being able to pull shit. This caught Magento's more antisocial tendencies on more than one occasion. * Admin login: use a path other than "/admin" to foil quite a lot of attack bots at the very simplest level. We have outsourced our remaining Magento, thankfully, and I don't personally have to maintain the above any more. (You know you've been administering Magento a bit long when you can hum along to bits of "Metal Machine Music" accurately.) The use case for Magento is (apparently deliberately) confused. It's an unholy melange of a CMS and a shopping basket. There is no good out-of-the-box experience; in practice it's a job creation scheme for consultants. Even crap-tier "well technically I can tell my boss's boss we have paid support" support, with a four-day response time for them to ask you a simple question you already put the answer to in the original ticket, is swingeingly expensive. I can't say what we're paying for this standard of quality, but I can say that it's public knowledge that Magento is at least $13k/yr: http://web.archive.org/web/20120215011525/http://www.magento... The problem Magento seems to solve is when the business wants a quick site without developer involvement. After a few other abortive platforms (Plone, Drupal - which are both fine for what they are, in ways Magento just isn't, but didn't end up matching our needs), our eventual solution to this was Wordpress, which we have outsourced so I don't have to think about that either. Outsourced Wordpress with securing it being the host's problem is totally the right answer. I don't have a good answer on the shopping basket, but Magento was bad enough at that too that we went back to our in-house homerolled system. I understand some work has gone into Magento 2.0 to make it less mind-bogglingly horrible.
In Ruining the Magic of Magento's Encryption Library

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