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maqp
tfc
Python2015–2026
maqp / tfc

tfc

Tinfoil Chat - Onion-routed, endpoint secure messaging system

17Distinct people
44Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
1.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Tinfoil Chat - Onion-routed, endpoint secure messaging system

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Thanks to everyone, I have realized I need to be more specific. I'm setting up my personal website, at myname.url , and I want to have a way of letting people get in touch with…

imagineerschool used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 1:56:48 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year44 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-02-08 14:32:51 UTC to 2026-06-04 03:16:13 UTC.

02462015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 2 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 0 submissions, 7 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 1 submissions, 6 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC624
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC707
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC716
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

6 sources
I couldn't agree more. It's a rare sight to see a secure communication tool be completely open about the complex threat model of modern world. When I started working on TFC (a messaging system that utilizes high assurance architecture like hardware-enforced TCB splitting and isolation), I wanted to be completely transparent about the threat model: https://github.com/maqp/tfc/wiki/Threat-model I knew not everyone would read it but not including it could do more damage to the user. I could've just reasoned "well, it's the most secure alternative out there, so why bother", but I assumed the system would be surpassed at some point, so I wanted people to know when that would happen. Perhaps, in a way I realized in order to distinguish the project from others, and to help people see the benefits, I would have to teach people about the threat mo
Read the rest
del. In a way even completely unencrypted apps like Palringo could be safe if they would communicate the threat model 100% transparently, i.e. they would teach about the different attacks, and with every step, they would tell you that the app does not protect from such or such an attacker. One problem here is of course, people don't really use the app for its security features, but to ease their lives. It's not that they don't care about security, they just don't evaluate it proactively, but switch to something else, reactively. So I no longer think transparent threat model is enough: the application should do what it can to protect its users. A reasonable limitation isn't "group chats can't have end-to-end encryption" or "multi-device app can't have end-to-end encryption", like Telegram shills/fanboys tout, this is just lack of good design. A reasonable limitation is "networked TCB can use E2EE for everything, but can't protect from remote key exfiltration with zero days". One responsible thing to do, would be to include recommendations to alternative products with security-convenience trade-offs that can't be solved with intelligent design. A kind of "If you're concerned with repeated code delivery problem our Protonmail web client suffers from, please consider using the native mobile apps we have. If OTOH you're concerned with endpoint security, look into traditional PGP with airgapped computer. Refer e.g. to what hak5 did with QR-code based ciphertext transfer". This alone would set protonmail among the best applications, but instead they choose to lie by omission that the JS web-client has equivalent security to their native clients. The threat model between the two apps is large enough to necessitate some kind of notification, but unfortunately they not only haven't addressed the issue, they refused to address the issue when it was pointed out to them. IMO we should consider such companies selfish and greedy.
In On Safety Critical Software
Strong encryption may be unbreakable in a mathematical sense but encrypted communications are not unbreakable in practice. Key extraction through side channels or compromise of communications by physical surveillance or evil maid attacks is practical. It just can't be done to a billion people at the same time. Read here https://github.com/maqp/tfc/wiki/Threat-model for an overview of all the ways an all-out, unusually secure encryption system (encryption and decryption done on separate computers with data diodes, 100% reproducible build) can be broken.
In Ask HN: What are your arguments in favor of end-to-end encryption?

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