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maqp
tfc
Python2015–2026
maqp / tfc

tfc

Tinfoil Chat - Onion-routed, endpoint secure messaging system

17Distinct people
44Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
1.3KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Tinfoil Chat - Onion-routed, endpoint secure messaging system

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

Thanks to everyone, I have realized I need to be more specific. I'm setting up my personal website, at myname.url , and I want to have a way of letting people get in touch with…

imagineerschool used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 6:28:55 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year44 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-02-08 14:32:51 UTC to 2026-06-04 03:16:13 UTC.

02462015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 2 submissions, 4 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 0 submissions, 7 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 7 mentions; 1 submissions, 6 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC624
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC707
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC716
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

7 sources
"- if you receive a stream of unencrypted postcards from Grandma on vacation" That's such a bullshit excuse. Everything goes with outer layer of encryption these days, what matters is will Telegram offer to lock themselves out of the messages to which the answer is no by default. If you want to chat on desktop or create a group, the answer is no whether you like it or not. So again, some niché use case of "it's probably nothing sensitive so you might as well send it in the clear because that says you're not a dissident" is thus not even valid. There's almost always outer layer of encryption. "The availability of metadata, who can access that metadata etc etc plays a role." Indeed. All the more reason to avoid Telegram that by default stores all that metadata. "someone always have to pull the E2E: Good, anything else: Bad." No the point is
Read the rest
we'll never even get to the debate on reducing metadata as long as we need to play whack-a-mole with shit apps like Telegram that don't E2EE by default, let alone provide any kind of metadata protection, even sealed sender like Signal does. As the author of messaging system[1] that provides both E2EE by default for everything as well as metadata protection (more than any other app out there) and advanced protections like endpoint security, I don't really like you putting me into some square of caring only about E2EE. All I can say to you is, first things first. [1] https://github.com/maqp/tfc
In Telegram messaging app proves crucial to Belarus protests
"I think it's important to distinguish mass surveillance from targeted surveillance. They present very different threat models." Targeted attacks against centralized points that enable wide-scale surveillance are mass surveillance. Imagine NSA would claim "A fiber optic splitter in the bottom of the ocean is a targeted attack against one device (repeater), or one inch segment of glass wire, it's not mass surveillance". It's vital that we define targeted surveillance as something where the target is a single entity. Hacking Moxie's phone is targeted surveillance. Hacking Signal server is not. Hacking every visitor of a CP site is mass surveillance https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/09/playpen-story-fbis-unp... "You might want to look at their in-progress P2P work." It will be a nice to have sure, but I think P2P should work exclusively via
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Tor if you want to hide metadata. wrt that, you might find my work interesting https://github.com/maqp/tfc "Briar fails unless you only talk to people using smartphones." A picture is worth a thousand words https://twitter.com/Amlk_B/status/1286642831239647232/photo/... "MoxieTalk fails because it exposes people to mass surveillance." Jabs like these aren't really appreciated. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.
In Briar Project
I apologize for the delay, I don't come here all the time. "E2EE's security is based on the use encryption and secret keys, which must remain secret -- there are a variety of ways that secret keys could potentially be compromised," The argument can not be "anything can be compromised with sufficient resources, _therefore it does not matter if you don't follow best practices within limitations of the architecture_". "Most of these attacks are out-of-band." Agreed, but you also can't argue "the rest of the entire software stack isn't perfect, therefore I don't have to follow best practices". If E2EE fails because of vulnerability in OS, you aren't responsible. If it fails because of vulnerability in your app, then you are responsible. The same way, messaging app vendor is responsible for not using E2EE protocol which eliminates a huge gapin
Read the rest
g hole: e.g. the entire crypto community has criticized Telegram cloud chats that leave plaintext copies of messages on the server. Not knowing this is the same as not doing your job. It's also the case you can design your software around more secure architecture to protect against remote key exfiltration, see my work on TFC for example: https://github.com/maqp/tfc "All I know is that if I ever created an app and ran a company and acted with the best intentions for my users" The question is, with E2EE becoming almost ubiquitous, would you really think not implementing modern encryption protocol is the same as acting with best intentions. "That is why I give ToTok the benefit of the doubt" I can see where you're coming from but having worked with secure messaging so long, to me it's the same as surgeon not verifying they were using industry standard materials for medical screws they use. Were they really acting in best interest of client? You can't excuse not verifying (industry best practice) just because you're "trying your best to minimize other complications". You're working with sensitive data. You have industry checklists available. If you choose the business, there will be obligations. You don't get benefit of the doubt as a participation award when it's effin obvious you did not use the checklist.
In ToTok, an Emirati messaging app, is the latest escalation of a digital arms race

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