Interesting that you tighten up privacy by adding more tracking to your main website with a cooking spanning sub-domains as well: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/commit/48545495afe1... and JS code from twitter directly: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/commit/30ece47f8930...
In Tightening up Privacy in Matrixmatrix-org
matrix.org
JavaScript2019–2024
matrix-org / matrix.org
matrix.org
matrix.org public website
25Distinct people
37Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
631GitHub stars
What to know before exploring
What it is
matrix.org public website
GitHub
Where it is used
No documented product use was verified in the last source check.
What people are saying
No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.
No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.
Also in these discussions
No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.
This week on Hacker News
Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 12:45:45 PM UTC.
No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.
Mentions over time
HN mentions by year37 dated mentions
Observed mentions: 2019-04-12 07:47:30 UTC to 2024-09-24 07:51:00 UTC.
Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.
View mention counts and date ranges
| Period | Start (UTC) | End (exclusive, UTC) | Mentions | Submissions | Comments |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 19 | 3 | 16 |
| 2020 | 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| 2021 | 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 1 | 0 | 1 |
| 2022 | 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| 2023 | 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 3 | 1 | 2 |
| 2024 | 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC | 8 | 1 | 7 |
From the project README
An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.
Read the project’s introduction
Matrix.org Website
If you want to contribute to the website, make sure the problem you're trying to
fix or the feature you want to implement has been discussed in our issue tracker
and that we are interested in reviewing and merging such a contribution.
We are self-documenting our processes in CONTRIBUTING.md
and how to write content for the website in CONTENT.md.
To discuss maintenance of this site, please come talk to us, the
Website & Content Working Group, in
#matrix.org-website:matrix.org.
Cloning the Repository
Due to historic growth and media the repository is quite large. Therefor we
suggest the usage of --filter=blob:none when doing a fresh clone:
git clone --filter=blob:none git@github.com:matrix-org/matrix.org.git
This allows to only fetch the actually needed things from the git repository
instead of all of the (at the time of writing) 1.18GiB of data.
With this command at the time of writing this reduces the downloaded data to
just 612MiB.
For more information on this please check out these 2 articles which also
explain why --depth=1 is not ideal and which implications this has:
https://github.blog/open-source/git/get-up-to-speed-with-partial-clone-and-shallow-clone/
https://web.archive.org/web/20241001150554/https://nayak.io/posts/git-clone-optimizations/
Building the website
Install version 0.20.0¹ of Zola, clone the repo,
and from the root of the repo type
zola serve
Zola will build the website and start a web server, usually at
http://127.0.0.1:1111
¹ This is the Zola version that is being used to build the website in CI.
See ./.github/workflows/zola.yml.
Read the full README on GitHubWhat Hacker News says
19 sourcesSo we just reworded some of the site, but agreed it needs more love. We're (hopefully) much better at writing communication protocols than describing them to a broad audience.
Proposals for changes are very welcome (although we can't guarantee we'll accept them verbatim); the new site lives at https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org. PRs welcome.
In Matrix 1.0 and the Matrix.org FoundationI (the repo owner) reposted them via links to archive.org after github deleted them, actually: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/367#issuecom.... See https://matrix.org/blog/2019/05/08/post-mortem-and-remediati... for the full details of what happened, fwiw.
In Matrix 1.0 and the Matrix.org FoundationI think the recent compromise at matrix.org [1] is a good example of how better defence in depth could have mitigated the damage done by an attacker who compromised a trusted machine. Specifically, access to a developer's SSH agent was the critical privilege escalation vector in this attack.
[1] https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/371
In Password expiration is dead, long live passwordsMatrix.org hacked, hacker posts helpful issues in their GitHub
4 points · Open discussionLooks like all issues created by the "hacker" have been removed?
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%...
In Matrix.org hackedThey were getting a ton of spam messages so they have been locked so that only collaborators can talk. They will be restored when the spam stops https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/367#issuecom....
In Matrix.org hackedGithub issue got closed or removed it looks like. There is a new issue where people are complaining about the first getting closed:
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/367
In Matrix.org hackedMatrix.org hack was published on GitHub
2 points · Open discussionI like the fact matrixnotorg decided to alert Matrix to Elasticsearch's existence.
But Matrix probably should first figure out how to fix the whole 'all server management ports are open to the internet' problem detailed here: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/360
The last thing we need is another Elasticsearch instance listening on a public IP accessible to the world.
In Matrix.org hackedTL;DR: Looks like there was a server with an unpatched Jenkins instance running, which allowed RCE. [0]
Someone (presumably a developer) was connected to that compromised server via SSH, and had forwarded their SSH agent to it. [1]
Apparently that person had root access to the production servers, allowing the attacker to login via the forwarded agent. Yikes.
[0]: https://matrix.org/blog/2019/04/11/security-incident/
[1]: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/358
In Matrix.org hackedI can see a lot of people trashing on Matrix.org or the "hacker" themselves (the hacker opened a series of issues, detailing how he managed to get in - https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/created_by/m...). However everyone seems to be missing the point - matrix seems like a pretty cool and open project. And someone taking over their infrastructure in such an open way is also great for the community. Even though a little dubious on the legal side of things, I believe it's great it was approached with transparency and a dose of humor.
Some might argue that this is harmful to matrix as a product and as a brand. But as long as there was no actual harm done and they react appropriately by taking infrastructure security seriously, it could play out well in the end for them. This whole ordeal could end up actually increase trust in t
Read the rest
he project, if they take swift steps to ensure that something like this does not happen again.
The hacker seems nice:
“Anyways, that's all for now. I hope this series of issues has given you some good ideas for how to prevent this level of compromise in the future. Security doesn't work retroactively, but I believe in you and I think you'll come back from this even stronger than before.
Or at least, I hope so -- My own information is in this user table.”
https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/365
In Matrix.org hackedThe (presumed) attacker opened a bunch of issues in Matrix' GitHub issue tracker, explaining the security issues leading to this compromise: https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix.org/issues/created_by/m...
TL;DR: A collection of inadvertences and suboptimal practices, some (like having GPG signing keys on production systems) more worrying than others. Something that could probably have happened to most orgs without dedicated security resources.
In Matrix.org hackedShowing the 15 most recent of 19 sources. Enable JavaScript to search and browse every indexed mention.