pushproxy

> For example, conversations which take place over iMessage and FaceTime are protected by end-to-end encryption so no one but the sender and receiver can see or read them. Apple cannot decrypt that data. I don’t know, then, why when I do an iCloud restore on a brand new device, all existing messages are recovered. Is this a way to recover all past messages that’s not really addressed, if I can still recover all historical messages after replacing all devices connected to an iCloud account at once? Cursory links: http://security.blogoverflow.com/2012/09/qotw-34-imessage-wh... https://github.com/meeee/pushproxy http://imfreedom.org/wiki/IMessage

http://ios-rev.tumblr.com/ http://imfreedom.org/wiki/IMessage https://github.com/meeee/pushproxy I was curious, too. I had lunch with the guy who made the proxy (man, I love living in Berlin) and discussed his efforts to reverse engineer the iMessage protocol (which runs inside/on top of Apple's push notification system). AFAICT, iMessage activation fetches a key from Apple that is either tied to or based on the hardware serial number. Based on Apple's history of rather excellent crypto implementations on iOS[1] I'm guessing that (on iOS) this key then gets signed by either the hardware key or somesuch to authenticate the device to the APNS. On OSX, the activation request includes the hardware serial number of the mac making the request, and the service rejects arbitrary SNs (though valid SNs are predictable so those can be used to get