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cheriot-ibex
SystemVerilog2023–2026
microsoft / cheriot-ibex

cheriot-ibex

cheriot-ibex is a RTL implementation of CHERIoT ISA based on LowRISC's Ibex core.

2Distinct people
2Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
139GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

cheriot-ibex is a RTL implementation of CHERIoT ISA based on LowRISC's Ibex core.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year2 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2023-09-12 08:29:22 UTC to 2026-07-15 11:15:27 UTC.

012023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20232024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20242025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
> Security through Obscurity still reigns. That's not the case at all. The spec is developed in the open: https://riscv.github.io/riscv-cheri/ If you want to run CHERI code, it's true that silicon isn't easily available, but that's simply because it takes time. Various companies are working on it (Codasip, SCI, Secqai, lowRISC, etc.). But you don't need silicon to run CHERI code. There are various emulators available that support it. There's QEMU: https://github.com/CHERI-Alliance/qemu There's also the RISC-V Sail model, this is the latest CHERI branch: https://github.com/CHERI-Alliance/sail-riscv (unfortunately it is a bit behind upstream master, and also a bit behind the latest CHERI spec which is still evolving). There are also a few open source chips available that implement CHERI which you can run in Verilator or an FPGA. For example
Read the rest
cheriot-ibex https://github.com/microsoft/cheriot-ibex . This is actually a variant of CHERI for microcontrollers called CHERIoT. Long story but the plan is to merge CHERIoT back into CHERI so it is just a "profile" of CHERI.
In RISC-V Is Inevitable: State of the Union Keynote Argues
Since this was published MS have published the RTL of their CHERIoT Ibex variant: https://github.com/microsoft/cheriot-ibex. There's also the full technical report and software stack including RTOS available: https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/publication/cheriot... I always thought it made more sense to try introducing capabilities on higher-performance applications (all the stuff you might use an arm A-class for) given they are pretty heavyweight. This is what Arm's Morello (https://www.arm.com/architecture/cpu/morello) offer. However introducing them at the low end, in the embedded space, instead may work a lot better. Within the A-class processor space there's a huge software ecosystem to work with and your software likely comes from multiple vendors, it's an uphill struggle to inject capabilities into that space, especially if
Read the rest
you want to make full use of them. With embedded applications you tend to have far tighter control over the whole software stack, there's a lot more vertical integration and it's pretty static. Once you've deployed your product it's doing the same job day in day out. You need occasional updates, maybe the odd new feature but it's a very different world to the software stack on the typical phone. So overall easier for a single company or group to say 'yes let's try capabilities' and just get on and do it. Security is potentially a lot more critical in these applications as well. Everyone knows IoT security is a joke but regulators are watching this too and there will be future legislation that will put a lot more liability on the manufacturers of IoT devices and they'll need to demonstrate they've taken security seriously, using a capability based system is one way to do that. Operational technology (industrial IoT) is also a key area of concern for security. Having unsecure internet enabled operational technology running critical infrastructure and industrial processes is clearly a major issue. The various cyber security agencies across the western world recognise this and published a guide: https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-by-des... urging security by design and default and it explicitly mentions CHERI. Again the initial costs and work to introduce capabilities become very justifiable against the security (and critically for companies, liability reduction) benefits.
In What’s the Smallest Variety of CHERI? (2022)

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