MSRC-Security-Research

> terms of our responsible disclosure policy I couldn't find a public copy of that. The best starting point I found for reporting vulnerabilities was: https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/security... You can email without agreeing to anything. But for a serious issue Microsoft would obviously try and track down who you are and what jurisdiction you are in.

You’ll find more primary sources across different organizations that all arrive at the 60 - 70% number. But what really grinds my gears here is that you take a piece from the article you’re criticizing and pretend that it’s a quote from Matt Miller. It’s actually quite easy to find a primary source here because the slides from the talk that the article is based on are available: https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas... To quote from those slides: „~70% of the vulnerabilities addressed through a security update each year continue to be memory safety issues“.

> It's still bizarre though that Rust is capturing such ridiculous mindshare. I don't think it's that bizarre. The two big headline features that bring Rust such popularity are: #1 "70% of bugs are memory-safety bugs" [1] and Rust can help solve those, and #2 C/C++ have a couple of package manager solutions - none of which have critical mass and Rust "comes with" cargo. Those two make me really eager to continue experimenting with Rust. > It seems to be a temporary low-level programming zeitgeist driven by YouTube and Reddit recommendation algorithms to an audience that has never done it and probably never will. This is some weird gatekeep-y kinda thing. Most of us didn't start out with low-level programming. Wouldn't it have been odd and frustrating for someone to tell your younger self that you have "never written C and probably neve

> And C++ just... doesn't have that many real problems. 70% of security bugs are memory safety issues. That's a lot of real problems. > It has a lot of irks, but the problems people run into are problems that others already solved, a thousand times, over the last half century, in many different ways for many different iterations of the language. People run into memory safety issues more often in new C++ code. https://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/memory-safet... https://security.googleblog.com/2021/09/an-update-on-memory-... https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas... https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/10/2003112742/-1/-1/0/CSI... https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2030/DEF%20CON%2030%20pre... https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/research/report-future-... https://alexgaynor.net/2020/may/27/science-on-memory-

Windows is likely a big task for the same reasons as SMAP (https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas...). XNU should be comparable to FreeBSD, which CheriBSD is a fork of, as both use Mach's VM for memory management and have a bunch of shared code in various places, but userspace is more of an unknown quite how much effort it'd be (you'll need to port Objective-C and, now, Swift, for example). For Chromium we have ported WebKit, so I'd imagine Blink isn't too dissimilar. V8 is likely interesting, though we have a version of WebKit's JSC JIT for Morello, which gives confidence in V8 being doable.

A related post from Google Security Blog[0]: > "A recent study[1] found that "~70% of the vulnerabilities addressed through a security update each year continue to be memory safety issues.” Another analysis on security issues in the ubiquitous `curl` command line tool showed that 53 out of 95 bugs would have been completely prevented by using a memory-safe language. [...]" [0]: https://security.googleblog.com/2021/02/mitigating-memory-sa... [1]: https://github.com/Microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas...

Here is some of the internal advocacy going on at Microsoft. - Managed languages if you can afford a GC - Rust - C++ with Core Guidelines https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/tree/mas... Note that there are still some teams like Azure Sphere and Azure RTOS, which are only providing C based SDKs, so no everyone is on the same wave length.

Here is the data from Microsoft Security Response Center on this [1]. Slide 5 shows double as many CVEs as 4-5 years prior, triple as many as 6-8 years prior. Further, slide 10 shows 70% of CVEs are memory safety and that ratio has been constant since 2006. It follows that the absolute number of CVEs which are memory safety is double 4-5 years prior and triple 6-8 years prior, which is inconsistent with a massive reduction. The magnitudes here are in the many hundreds of CVEs per year from Microsoft (and growing), not "one CVE in 2021". 70% there is not a negligible number. [1] https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/blob/mas...

Microsoft security unit also thinks that way. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PjbGojjnBZQ https://github.com/microsoft/MSRC-Security-Research/tree/mas... "Future development should be a mix of C#, Rust and constrained C++." Which is also a reason why they aren't that bothered into keeping plain old C around on VC++, beyond ISO C++ requirements.