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microsoft
snmalloc
C++2019–2025
microsoft / snmalloc

snmalloc

Message passing based allocator

14Distinct people
18Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
2KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Message passing based allocator

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 2:59:53 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year18 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-01-16 11:45:03 UTC to 2025-12-19 11:19:41 UTC.

0123452019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 3 submissions, 2 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 2 submissions, 0 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC532
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC220
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211

What Hacker News says

5 sources
https://github.com/microsoft/snmalloc#snmalloc mentions two biggest motivations as: > Allocations on one thread are freed by a different thread I can imagine one use-case for this: a task that is scheduled from and executed by a work-stealing thread-pool can allocate memory in one thread but by design there's no guarantee that the memory will be necessarily freed from that exact thread. Would that be a good use-case for snmalloc? > Deallocations occur in large batches This sounds much like a bump allocator use-case but which can do this exact thing by calling a single munmap(addr, len) and unmap multiple allocations all at once.
In Snmalloc: A Message Passing Allocator
While reviewing that doc, I also came across this. Seems very interesting -- I did not know this was possible: > Some architectures, such as CHERI (including Arm's Morello), explicitly consider pointer provenance and bounds in addition to their target addresses. Adding these considerations to the architecture enables software to constrain uses of particular pointers in ways that are not available with traditional protection mechanisms. For example, while code may have a pointer that spans its entire C stack, it may construct a pointer that authorizes access only to a particular stack allocation (e.g., a buffer) and use this latter pointer while copying data. Even if an attacker is able to control the length of the copy, the bounds imposed upon pointers involved can ensure that an overflow is impossible. (On the other hand, if the attacker
Read the rest
can influence both the bounds and the copy length, an overflow may still be possible; in practice, however, the two concerns are often sufficiently separated.) For malloc() in particular, it is enormously beneficial to be able to impose bounds on returned pointers: it becomes impossible for allocator clients to use a pointer from malloc() to access adjacent allocations! https://github.com/microsoft/snmalloc/blob/main/docs/StrictP... I wonder to what extent moving bounds checks into hardware provides the potential for efficient memory safety.
In Snmalloc: A Message Passing Allocator

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