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monero-project
kovri
C++2016–2018
monero-project / kovri · Archived

kovri

The Kovri I2P Router Project

Explore on GitHubRead Hacker News discussions
7Distinct people
8Mentions
1Explicit recommenders
573GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

The Kovri I2P Router Project

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

>I get that. But how are the hackers who stole / continue to steal from exchanges like in the Mt Gox hack -- and more recently, the CoinCheck[1] -- hack, able to get away with…

EthanHeilman used a recommendation phrase. One indexed comment matches. This is a phrase match, not a verdict.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month8 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-07-02 22:06:55 UTC to 2018-03-02 21:36:38 UTC.

01232016-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 commentsJul 20162016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsMay 20172017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMar 2018

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Jul 20162016-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Aug 20162016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Sep 20162016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20162016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20162016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20162016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20172017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20172017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20172017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20172017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20172017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20172017-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20172017-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC312
Sep 20172017-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20172017-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20172017-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20172017-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20182018-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20182018-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-04-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

8 sources
EthanHeilman·Mar 2, 2018Recommendation phrase
>I get that. But how are the hackers who stole / continue to steal from exchanges like in the Mt Gox hack -- and more recently, the CoinCheck[1] -- hack, able to get away with it? See CoinCheck link and quote below. Important takeaway is It is a good question and I don't have an answer as I don't know many of the details of the Mt. Gox hack. Many details on these hacks are not public. There have been arrests in Mt. Gox BTW. My favorite quote on this subject is: 1. One possible answer is that the attackers just sit on the coins and don't attempt cash them out see "Bitcoin offers privacy — as long as you don't cash out or spend it". 2. Another possibility is the thieves either live or cashed out in jurisdictions which won't cooperate with investigations. 3. Or as your article states the thieves could attempt to move the coins through privac
Read the rest
y coins such as zCash or Monero to hide the final destinations of the coins. However that is a fairly risky proposition, if they make a mistake they are cooked and there are so many mistakes they could make. I don't believe either zCash or Monero offer network level privacy other than TOR and TOR is problematic as it was not designed for cryptocurrencies. Monero is planning I2P support [0]. Then again it could be the case that law enforcement organizations investigating some of these cases don't have the expertise to understand the highly technical evidence they have. [0]: https://github.com/monero-project/kovri
In Bitcoin faces regulatory crackdown, Bank of England warns
pebx·Aug 9, 2017
Come on, you know the history of the whole fucked up situation and now turning you into the role about the caring i2pd project manager? Let's say what we can see on GitHub in your repository... https://github.com/PurpleI2P/i2pd/graphs/contributors Where have you been between June and November 2015? Kovri was meant to be just an integration of i2pd into Monero, not a fork. But yeah... When the only maintainer of a project is gone for half a year, what do you expect? Anyone familiar with Git is able to see when anonimal finally forked away... https://github.com/monero-project/kovri/graphs/contributors But yeah, then you came back and started developing again after 6 months of nothing? Just don't be like an offended asshole and maybe try to cooperate or just let it go the open source way and the better solution will probably get the most ado
Read the rest
ption.
In Kovri – A secure, private, untraceable C++ implementation of the I2P network
arpstick·Aug 9, 2017
https://github.com/monero-project/kovri/blob/3dbfb89d07a82d5... there is an off-by-one that prevents the dht from working properly, it actively poisons the network. i fixed this in i2pd last year, the code changed so much I think that's where it is located now. there are a few more bugs like that i know of off the top of my head but i'd need more coffee. i got kicked off kovri for trying to fix bugs, good luck to them in the future. they're going to need a major management additude readjustment if they want to provide a proper functioning i2p router, so far all they have done is shoo away competent developers with the way they treat PR. further updates: kovri does not provide extra "security" or "quality" as seemingly none of the bugs I and many others fixed in i2pd have been fixed in kovri. that document is a huge load. if anyone wants t
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o contribute to i2pd see: https://github.com/purplei2p/i2pd/
In Kovri – A secure, private, untraceable C++ implementation of the I2P network
robert_foss·Jul 2, 2016
> Thanks for contributing to I2P! ;) My contributions are relatively minor and I2P (as well as other crypto systems) is something I really believe in. > Do you have any thoughts on HORNET? Could I2P benefit from a more stateless routing mechanism as opposed to tunnels in the far future? It's been a while since I read the HORNET paper, but as I remember it, HORNET relied heavily on ISP level cooperation which is just not realistic. However, the idea of reducing state is a very good one. Going forward I hope to see more cryptographic systems that aspire to reduce overall state. > I'm working on Go implementation here: https://github.com/hkparker/go-i2p. Haven't made to irc2p to introduce myself yet but I will. Are there any devs who might be interested in contributing? Currently there are 3 implementations of I2P apart from yours. The orig
Read the rest
inal java one, i2pd[1] and kovri[2]. We all cooperate and discuss specifications to maintain interoperability. However the alternative implementations are not maintained under the I2P project as the developers of them desire to be separate. I was previously unaware of your Go implementation, but you should definitely head over to #i2p-dev and say hi. You can find me under the nick hottuna there. > Privacy of developers seems a priority. Without any detail of course, can you comment on how necessary this has been. Is it irresponsible of me to work on an implementation in the clear? About privacy, people have taken various stances. Some a truly anonymous, some are semi anonymous, and some like me are not anonymous. Maintaining privacy for a while might be a good idea. You can always get less anonymous, but going the other way is harder. [1] https://github.com/PurpleI2P/i2pd [2] https://github.com/monero-project/kovri
In I2P: Invisible Internet Protocol

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