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netblue30
firejail
C2016–2026
netblue30 / firejail

firejail

Linux namespaces and seccomp-bpf sandbox

36Distinct people
44Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
7.7KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Linux namespaces and seccomp-bpf sandbox

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 3:16:21 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year44 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-04-21 12:53:43 UTC to 2026-05-20 20:09:13 UTC.

02468102016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 1 submissions, 3 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 2 submissions, 4 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 0 submissions, 8 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 1 submissions, 8 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC413
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC624
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC808
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC918
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

From the project README

An excerpt from the repository, fetched Nov 13, 2026.

Read the project’s introduction
Firejail Firejail is a lightweight security tool intended to protect a Linux system by setting up a restricted environment for running (potentially untrusted) applications. More specifically, it is an SUID sandbox program that reduces the risk of security breaches by using Linux namespaces, seccomp-bpf and Linux capabilities. It allows a process and all its descendants to have their own private view of the globally shared kernel resources, such as the network stack, process table and mount table. Firejail can work in an SELinux or AppArmor environment, and it is integrated with Linux Control Groups. Written in C with virtually no dependencies, the software runs on any Linux computer with a 3.x kernel version or newer. It can sandbox any type of processes: servers, graphical applications, and even user login sessions. The software includes sandbox profiles for a number of more common Linux programs, such as Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, VLC, Transmission etc. The sandbox is lightweight, the overhead is low. There are no complicated configuration files to edit, no socket connections open, no daemons running in the background. All security features are implemented directly in Linux kernel and available on any Linux computer. Videos Quick Start Advanced Browser Security Tor Browser Security Links Project webpage: https://firejail.wordpress.com/ IRC: https://web.libera.chat/#firejail Download and Installation: https://firejail.wordpress.com/download-2/ Features: https://firejail.wordpress.com/features-3/ Documentation: https://firejail.wordpress.com/documentation-2/ FAQ: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/wiki/Frequently-Asked-Questions Wiki: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/wiki GitHub Actions: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/actions GitLab CI: https://gitlab.com/Firejail/firejail_ci/pipelines Debian CI: https://salsa.debian.org/reiner/firejail Debian Package Tracker: https://tracker.debian.org/pkg/firejail Ubuntu PPA: https://launchpad.net/~deki/+archive/ubuntu/firejail Video Channel: https://odysee.com/@netblue30:9?order=new Backup Video Channel: https://www.bitchute.com/profile/JSBsA1aoQVfW/ Security vulnerabilities See SECURITY.md. Installing For the supported versions, see SECURITY.md. Debian Note: The versions from Debian stable and backports are likely to be outdated, so currently we recommend either downloading and installing the .deb package from the latest release: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/releases/latest Or building from source. Old instructions Debian stable (bullseye): We recommend to use the backports package. Ubuntu Note: The versions from the distribution and PPA are likely to be outdated, so currently we recommend either downloading and installing the .deb package from the latest release: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/releases/latest Or building from source. Old instructions Note: The PPA recommendation is mainly for firejail itself; it should be fine to install firetools and firejail-related tools directly from the distribution if they are not in the PPA as they tend to be updated less frequently. For Ubuntu 18.04+ and derivatives (such as Linux Mint), users are strongly advised to use the PPA. How to add and install from the PPA: sudo add-apt-repository ppa:deki/firejail sudo apt-get update sudo apt-get install firejail firejail-profiles Reason: The firejail package for Ubuntu 20.04 has been left vulnerable to CVE-2021-26910 for months after a patch for it was posted on Launchpad: CVE-2021-26910 firejail version in Ubuntu 20.04 LTS is vulnerable to CVE-2021-26910 See also https://wiki.ubuntu.com/SecurityTeam/FAQ: What software is supported by the Ubuntu Security team? Ubuntu is currently divided into four components: main, restricted, universe and multiverse. All binary packages in main and restricted are supported by the Ubuntu Security team for the life of an Ubuntu release, while binary packages in universe and multiverse are supported by the Ubuntu community. Additionally, the PPA version is likely to be more recent and to contain more profile fixes. See the following discussions for details: Should I keep using the version of firejail available in my distro repos? How to install the latest version on Ubuntu and derivatives Other Firejail is available in multiple Linux distributions: Repology Other than the aforementioned exceptions, as long as your distribution provides a supported version of firejail, it's generally a good idea to install it from the distribution. The version can be checked with firejail --version after installing. You can also install one of the released packages. Building Instructions for building and installing the current development version from source. It is recommended to use the distribution-specific instructions below when applicable, as they generate native packages, which should make integration with the rest of the system and package management easier. For other distributions, see the generic instructions. See also .gitlab-ci.yml for how distribution-specific builds are done in CI. Arch Note: The AUR package is not maintained by us. Install firejail-git from the AUR. Example: yay -S firejail-git Debian For Debian, Ubuntu and derivatives: Note: Any ./configure flags should be passed to mkdeb.sh (such as ./mkdeb.sh --enable-foo). sudo apt-get update -qy sudo apt-get install -qy \ git build-essential fakeroot lintian libapparmor-dev pkg-config gawk git clone 'https://github.com/netblue30/firejail.git' && cd firejail && ./configure && make dist && ./mkdeb.sh && sudo dpkg -i ./*.deb && make installcheck Fedora For Fedora and derivatives: Note: Any ./configure flags should be passed to mkrpm.sh (such as ./platform/rpm/mkrpm.sh --enable-foo). sudo dnf update -y sudo dnf install -y rpm-build gcc make git clone 'https://github.com/netblue30/firejail.git' && cd firejail && ./configure && make dist && ./platform/rpm/mkrpm.sh && sudo rpm -i ./*.rpm && make in
Read the full README on GitHub

What Hacker News says

9 sources
The owner module can control outbound communication by uid/gid. [1] There are no modules to handle things by PID AFAIK. This can however be accomplished by SELinux and Apparmor custom rules but that is a loaded topic. Firejail [2] and Bubblewrap [3] can put limits on application capabilities and/or take away network access. Firejail has default policies for many applications, all of which can be overridden by user configurations in their home directory. Firejail leverages Linux Capabilities and AppArmor. For example, when I launch VLC even if it were configured to pull down album information, it could not. If one day they added default-enabled telemetry to VLC it would go nowhere. A round-about and heavy handed way to manage communications by PID would be to isolation applications in their own VM or container and map the VM or conta
Read the rest
In Microsoft is phoning home the content of PowerPoint slides
Reasonable Linux distro that balances security, privacy and usability? I would interpret that as a Linux distribution that is kept up to date, is easy to configure, does not have dial-home cruft and has decent documentation. This is just my own take but opinions will vary wildly for everything I will add here. - Kept up to date would be all the popular distributions that are not niche focused such as the security/privacy distro's that you mentioned. They have a small user base and do not has as regular of a cadence of updates. So Arch, Alpine, Alma, Debian, CentOS/Redhat, Fedora, QubesOS, Rocky, Void, Ubuntu. Fedora and Ubuntu will have the most recent a.k.a. bleeding edge versions of upstream packages but most of the distributions are not far behind. The oldest and most battle hardened versions of software would be on CentOS/RHEL wi
Read the rest
th back-ported bug and security fixes. I intentionally left out Gentoo and LinuxFromScratch as those are for people that love tinkering and troubleshooting. - Not dialing home is devolving by the day but Alpine, Alma, Arch, Debian, CentOS, Qubues, Rocky, Void are not chatty. Fedora recently started dialing home quite heavily for desktop users and even mimic some Microsoft behavior in the latest Beta. Hopefully they will turn this off after Beta because blocking it breaks the desktop. Ubuntu had a few mis-steps in this area in the past but I do not know if Canonical curtailed the dialing home, this was some time ago. Something to keep an eye on in this area is systemd-resolvd as this is evolving and has the potential to get leaky but that is a topic in and of itself. - Arch has incredible documentation. They are an outlier in this area. Behind them I would place Debian, CentOS, Fedora and Ubuntu. The others have hit-or-miss documentation that sometimes requires a search engine to fill the gaps, especially as it pertains to real world examples. - Easiest to configure would be Ubuntu as it had heavy adoption early on by many developers, followed by Fedora. Both have a myriad of example configurations in their documentation and endless examples on StackExchange, Serverfault, etc... Again, just my own opinions. I tried to not be biased. I am a pragmatic minimalist and do not like shiny or trendy things. I personally prefer Void and Qubes for desktop and Alpine for VM's, Routers, Firewalls, etc... Qubes should have a decent amount of memory, maybe 32GB+. Both have some minor annoyances that would frustrate people new to Linux. All of the popular distributions can be locked down to be less chatty using outbound firewall rules with the iptables "owner" module with exception to Fedora's Beta. If you want to go beyond user-based+port-based rules then there is an open source project called OpenSnitch that mimics the behavior of LittleSnitch (mac). [1] Blocking the chatty behavior of Fedora will break it, especially their admin sub-domain. It is equivalent to Microsofts access sub-domain used heavily be the Home edition. Beyond the basic hardening of an OS if one wanted to really lock things down and assuming they understand Linux networking principals, then QubesOS + a custom Firewall VM clone + Custom Whonix VM clone has the potential to leak the least data but this assumes that one already greatly understands networking, linux, all the internet services. There are no turn-key solutions for this that fill knowledge gaps, despite there being several that claim to do so. If going down this path, I suggest using a spare machine that you would not mind blowing away and re-configuring VM's as a matter of a learning exercise. Reducing chatty'ness of user-space applications like Firefox would be user.js [2] and controlling what those applications can see or not see would be firejail available in some distro repos. [3] Additional hardening can be implemented using one of the five security modules in the Linux kernel, with the most common being AppArmor and SELinux but one must really learn how these work to get the most out of them. Most applications in a Linux distro have existing MAC rules. Custom applications would need custom MAC rules to secure them. The default rules in AppArmor and SELinux are designed for a balance of security and usability rather than security+privacy. All of the distributions can be stripped down to be as lean as you want. [1] - https://github.com/evilsocket/opensnitch [2] - https://github.com/arkenfox/user.js [3] - https://github.com/netblue30/firejail
In Ask HN: Reasonable Linux distro that balances security, privacy and usability?
I am one of the few exceptions not the rule so take what I say with a grain of salt. I browse the web with JavaScript and external fonts disabled. I also force every site to use the same font and font size. I enable JavaScript if I know who is running a site and where their company is located and/or if I have a binding contract with them. Even then I use disposable containers [1] for those sites and run bleachbit before/after visiting such sites and use sqlite3 to clear visit_time from places.sqlite. I launch Firefox from firejail [2] with AppArmor enforcement. [1] - https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/temporary-con... [2] - https://github.com/netblue30/firejail
In Ask HN: Do you browse the web with JavaScript disabled?
For GUI applications, firejail might be easier to use. It too isolates applications from your system, but comes with a bunch of pre-configured profiles for many popular applications (including proprietary ones), thus requiring zero configuration. Some of its more interesting features (in addition to the obvious path/privilege restrictions): - putting the application into a separate network namespace with its own firewall rules/network interfaces (for example, you can force Firefox to work through a VPN connection only, or block incoming connections with your main firewall rules and allow them for a single application) - using a separate X server for each application (works pretty much transparently) - setting resource limits (network bandwidth, memory, CPU, I/O; although not as flexible as systemd limits, they can be combined) - running `
Read the rest
sudo firecfg` once will create a bunch of symlinks for all applications installed on your system and supported by firejail. After that, those applications will run under a sandbox automatically. Or you can create them manually (I did it for the PDF reader and such). https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/
In Ask HN: What do you use VMs for regularly?
[1] discusses firejail running as root: > For a server, the process exposed to the outside world runs as an unprivileged user (unbound or nobody). The process is started by a separate process running as root (as explained by @Ferroin above). The starting process is never exposed to outside. > The same is true for Firejail. By the time the unprivileged server process starts, Firejail is already sleeping. And I think Docker has a similar problem as mentioned in the "warning" section in [2]: > Warning: Anyone added to the docker group is root equivalent because they can use the docker run --privileged command to start containers with root privileges. For more information see [3] and [4]. [1]: https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/issues/1720 [2]: https://wiki.archlinux.org/title/Docker#Installation
In SELinux is unmanageable; just turn it off if it gets in your way
This is a very handy command in day-to-day work, actually. For example, I use to limit the total amount of memory available to an application, including page cache: $ systemd-run --user --scope --property=MemoryHigh=1G qbittorrent It works just as you'd expect — if qbittorrent's working set goes above 1024 MiB, it pushes the least recently used page out of the page cache. Doesn't really have any effects on upload or download speeds, while helping to keep more useful data in memory. Many isolation flags are not available in `systemd-run --user`, though, so if you'd like to have some protection you either have to combine `sudo systemd-run` with `su -c`, or wrap the command in firejail. https://github.com/netblue30/firejail/
In Systemd service sandboxing and security hardening (2020)

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