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nodejs
NG
Web Development2015–2017
nodejs / NG · Archived

NG

Next Generation JavaScript IO Platform

6Distinct people
7Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
102GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Next Generation JavaScript IO Platform

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 11:56:56 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month7 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-08-01 12:24:23 UTC to 2017-05-08 13:19:31 UTC.

0122015-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 commentsAug 20152015-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2015-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2015-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2015-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2015-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2016-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsJun 20162016-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMay 2017

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Aug 20152015-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-09-01 00:00:00 UTC110
Sep 20152015-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20152015-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20152015-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2015-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20152015-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20162016-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20162016-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20162016-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20162016-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20162016-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20162016-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20162016-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20162016-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20162016-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Nov 20162016-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20162016-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Feb 20172017-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20172017-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20172017-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC110
May 20172017-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-06-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

7 sources
The situation is still that callbacks are king in the node core libraries. But there is some talk about how to move forward[0], however I don't think there has been much headway as of the last time I really looked into it about 6-months ago. That being said, there are some fantastic libraries which you can use as a drop-in replacement for the core libraries provide a promise based API, but nothing in core directly. [0] https://github.com/nodejs/NG/issues/25
In Understanding Node.js Event-Driven Architecture
I've got to say though, that this is a wee bit frustrating as a developer. SSL libraries are terrible, bug ridden, hard to work with, and there are huge sacrifices using a pass-through proxy to offer SSL. The brittleness of SSL libraries manifests not just in the form of security exploits, but also in the form of delaying the next generation of HTTP technology. Node doesn't support natively support HTTP/2 due to HTTP2 fitting issues [https://github.com/nodejs/NG/issues/8]. Jetty was delayed for Java SLL changes. Same with Go. If Google wants to make the whole web secure? That's great. But we also need to work on making it simple to secure. So much research goes into novel ciphers and optimal ways to defeat timing attacks, and etc etc, but the spike in complexity means that we're reaching a point where almost no individual or group can app
Read the rest
roach a correct implementation. It worries me that we're approaching a point where we're utterly dependent on a security standard no one can understand.
In Chrome 56 will mark HTTP pages with password fields as non-secure
Would love to but @izs deleted his tweets a couple of hours later. The entire ordeal happened back in January (I think), around the same time as some other npm drama (e.g. https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/3959 and https://github.com/nodejs/TSC/issues/21 and https://github.com/nodejs/NG/issues/26, leading up to https://github.com/nodejs/NG/issues/29) -- the twitter incident gets referenced in some of the comments. There are however plenty of comments by NPM representatives (including izs) that they see it as a moral obligation to uphold their CoC even beyond the scope of NPM itself (implying what izs proposed). There's a fundamental divide going on between people who think open source (code, not communities) should be attached to certain moral values and those thinking it should be agnostic of social issues. Similar to the Open Source
Read the rest
vs Free Software divide in the 1990s. Except while the FSF was the one arguing on moral grounds before, the new movement is actually in conflict with one of the main concepts of the GPL: authors should not be able to restrict how code can be used and by whom (i.e. you can't prohibit people from using code for evil if it should be GPL compatible).
In I've Just Liberated My Modules

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