noise_spec

What are real world implementations of the Noise Protocol? https://github.com/noiseprotocol/noise_spec/blob/v34/noise.m... Quick search shows WireGuard protocol, but I am not sure if how much of the WireGuard protocol is the same as the Noise Protocol. https://www.wireguard.com/formal-verification/ https://www.wireguard.com/papers/wireguard-formal-verificati... The WireGuard protocol is extensively detailed in [2], which itself is based on the NoiseIK [3] handshake.

Ok, another suggestion: The Noise Protocol Framework. https://github.com/noiseprotocol/noise_spec/commit/213237c43... https://noiseprotocol.org/

Why is this even supporting HTTP 1.1? And why HTTP at all and not just HTTPS? Encryption should be the default on all protocols going forward. No exceptions. And I agree, it should use something like a Noise protocol even instead of HTTPS. http://noiseprotocol.org/ https://github.com/noiseprotocol/noise_spec/wiki/Noise-prope...

Any idea how it compares to CurveCP [http://curvecp.org/] and Noise [https://github.com/trevp/noise/wiki]?

Noise or MinimaLT. Noise is mostly concept right now, though, but MinimaLT implementation is coming later this year: https://github.com/trevp/noise/wiki/Noise-properties-and-pro... http://cr.yp.to/tcpip/minimalt-20130522.pdf CurveCP also already exists. And there's this, too: http://tcpcrypt.org/

This is discussed at https://github.com/trevp/noise/wiki/Noise-properties-and-pro... CurveCP: CurveCP lacks in-connection forward secrecy and resistance to key-compromise impersonation for the server. Also, a compromised ephemeral client key can be used permanently for impersonating the client. CurveCP requires the client to know the server's key prior to connecting, so trust models based on server certificates or "Trust-on-First-Use" are not directly supported. Like NaCl, it has a 128-bit security level.