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nolabs-ai
nono
Rust2026–2026
nolabs-ai / nono

nono

agent runtime security - zero trust, zero setup, zero latency agent sandboxing

12Distinct people
20Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
4.9KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

agent runtime security - zero trust, zero setup, zero latency agent sandboxing

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 7:27:27 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month20 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-02-01 21:35:04 UTC to 2026-10-22 19:51:42 UTC.

024682026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 5 submissions, 3 commentsFeb 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 commentsJun 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC853
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

8 sources
Read the rest
In macOS's Little-Known Command-Line Sandboxing Tool (2025)
Hey HN Luke here. I wanted to introduce a project I have building for the past few weeks in response to events such as openclaw and the glaring security issues at hand. Prior to nono, I created Sigstore , a project used for software supply chain security now used by pypi, npm, brew and GitHub for release attestation and provence. The problem: Protecting the host from the agent is largely solved, microVMs (kata, firecracker), containers , nono is more focused on protecting the environment or workspace itself - having said that, the isolation controls from the host are pretty solid as we use landlock and seatbelt. nono uses OS-level isolation, atomic snapshots, and command auditing, secret / token protections (using keychain on linux and the secure enclave chip on apple) Linux: Landlock LSM (kernel 5.13+) macOS: Seatbelt (sandbox_init) Afte
Read the rest
r sandbox + exec(), there's no syscall to expand permissions. The kernel says no. Filesystem: read/write/allow per directory or file Network: block entirely (per-host filtering planned) Atomic Rollbacks: Content-addressable storage — Files are stored by SHA-256 hash. Identical content is never duplicated, keeping storage efficient even across long sessions with many reverts — Every snapshot is committed to a Merkle tree. Tampering or corruption becomes more easily detectable Audit trail of commands: nono automatically generates a cryptographically verifiable audit trail of every file change made by a sandboxed AI agent. SDKs. We have two SDKs releasing soon using FFI bindings, python and typescript to allow uses to easily implement nono features into their own code base. Technical details: Written in Rust. Uses the landlock crate on Linux, raw FFI to sandbox_init() on macOS. Secrets via keyring crate. All paths canonicalized at grant time to prevent symlink escapes. Landlock ABI v4+ gives us TCP port filtering. Older kernels fall back to full network allow/deny. macOS Seatbelt profiles are generated dynamically as Scheme-like DSL strings. Limitations: Network is binary, on or off - plans are in place to introduce IP filtering. GitHub: https://github.com/always-further/nono Docs: https://docs.nono.dev Site: https://noto.sh Apache 2.0. Would love feedback!
In Kernel-enforced sandbox App and SDK for AI agents, MCP and LLM workloads

Show HN: Nono – Kernel-enforced sandboxing for AI agents

The problem: AI agents execute code on your machine. Prompt injections, hallucinations, or compromised tools can read ~/.ssh, exfiltrate credentials, or worse. Application-level sandboxes can be bypassed by the code they're sandboxing. I have been around security for a long old time now (i started something called sigstore a few years back) and have seen this pattern so many times before. nono uses OS-level isolation that userspace can't escape: Linux: Landlock LSM (kernel 5.13+) macOS: Seatbelt (sandbox_init) After sandbox + exec(), there's no syscall to expand permissions. The kernel says no. What it does: nono run --profile openclaw -- openclaw gatewa nono run --allow . --net-block -- npm install nono run --secrets api_key -- ./my-agent Filesystem: read/write/allow per directory or file Network: block entirely (per-host filtering pla
Read the rest
nned) Secrets: loads from macOS Keychain / Linux Secret Service, injects as env vars, zeroizes after exec Technical details: Written in Rust. ~2k LOC. Uses the landlock crate on Linux, raw FFI to sandbox_init() on macOS. Secrets via keyring crate. All paths canonicalized at grant time to prevent symlink escapes. Landlock ABI v4+ gives us TCP port filtering. Older kernels fall back to full network allow/deny. macOS Seatbelt profiles are generated dynamically as Scheme-like DSL strings. Limitations: macOS: Currently allows all reads to make executables work. Tightening in next release. Linux: Landlock doesn't cover everything (no UDP filtering until recent kernels, no syscall filtering - that's seccomp territory) No Windows support (yet?) GitHub: https://github.com/lukehinds/nono Docs: https://docs.nono.dev Site: https://noto.sh Apache 2.0. Would love feedback on the security model, especially from folks who've worked with Landlock or Seatbelt. Having said that, the code needs a good tidy and I am not exactly proud of it, so go easy on me!
1 points · Open discussion

Show HN: Nono – Kernel-enforced sandboxing for AI agents

Hey HN Luke here. I built nono and got it out quick then I expected, in response to the openclaw carnage, but its use is beyond openclaw. The problem: AI agents execute code on your machine. Prompt injections, hallucinations, or compromised tools can read ~/.ssh, exfiltrate credentials, or worse. Application-level sandboxes can be bypassed by the code they're sandboxing. I have been around security for a long old time now (i started something called sigstore a few years back) and have seen this pattern so many times before. The solution pitch: nono uses OS-level isolation that userspace can't escape: Linux: Landlock LSM (kernel 5.13+) macOS: Seatbelt (sandbox_init) After sandbox + exec(), there's no syscall to expand permissions. The kernel says no. What it does: nono run --read ./src --allow ./output -- cargo build nono run --profile cla
Read the rest
ude-code -- claude nono run --allow . --net-block -- npm install nono run --secrets api_key -- ./my-agent Filesystem: read/write/allow per directory or file Network: block entirely (per-host filtering planned) Secrets: loads from macOS Keychain / Linux Secret Service, injects as env vars, zeroizes after exec Technical details: Written in Rust. ~2k LOC. Uses the landlock crate on Linux, raw FFI to sandbox_init() on macOS. Secrets via keyring crate. All paths canonicalized at grant time to prevent symlink escapes. Landlock ABI v4+ gives us TCP port filtering. Older kernels fall back to full network allow/deny. macOS Seatbelt profiles are generated dynamically as Scheme-like DSL strings. Limitations: macOS: Currently allows all reads to make executables work. Tightening in next release. Linux: Landlock doesn't cover everything (no UDP filtering until recent kernels, no syscall filtering - that's seccomp territory) No Windows support (yet?) Origin: Built this for OpenClaw (AI agent platform handling Telegram/WhatsApp messages). Needed real isolation, not "please don't read this file" isolation. Generalized it because every agent runner has this problem. GitHub: https://github.com/lukehinds/nono Docs: https://docs.nono.dev Site: https://noto.sh Apache 2.0. Would love feedback on the security model, especially from folks who've worked with Landlock or Seatbelt. Having said that, the code needs a good tidy and I am not exactly proud of it, so go easy on me!
4 points · Open discussion

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