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nolabs-ai
nono
Rust2026–2026
nolabs-ai / nono

nono

agent runtime security - zero trust, zero setup, zero latency agent sandboxing

12Distinct people
20Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
4.9KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

agent runtime security - zero trust, zero setup, zero latency agent sandboxing

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 5:58:53 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month20 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-02-01 21:35:04 UTC to 2026-10-22 19:51:42 UTC.

024682026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 5 submissions, 3 commentsFeb 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 commentsJun 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC853
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

2 sources
Hey HN. I'm Luke, security engineer and creator of Sigstore and other open source security projects. I've been building nono, an open source sandbox for AI coding agents that uses kernel-level enforcement (Landlock/Seatbelt) to restrict what agents can do on your machine. One thing that's been bugging me: we give agents our API keys as environment variables, and a single prompt injection can exfiltrate them via env, /proc/PID/environ, or just an outbound HTTP call. The blast radius is the full scope of that key. So we built what we're calling the "phantom token pattern" — a credential injection proxy that sits outside the sandbox. The agent never sees real credentials. It gets a per-session token that only works only with the session bound localhost proxy. The proxy validates the token (constant-time), strips it, injects the real credenti
Read the rest
al, and forwards upstream over TLS. If the agent is fully compromised, there's nothing worth stealing. Real credentials live in the system keystore (macOS Keychain / Linux Secret Service), memory is zeroized on drop, and DNS resolution is pinned to prevent rebinding attacks. It works transparently with OpenAI, Anthropic, and Gemini SDKs — they just follow the *_BASE_URL env vars to the proxy. Blog post walks through the architecture, the token swap flow, and how to set it up. Would love feedback from anyone thinking about agent credential security. https://nono.sh/blog/blog-credential-injection We also have other features we have shipped, such as atomic rollbacks, Sigstore based SKILL attestation. https://github.com/always-further/nono
In Credential Protection for AI Agents: The Phantom Token Pattern

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