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nolabs-ai
nono
Rust2026–2026
nolabs-ai / nono

nono

agent runtime security - zero trust, zero setup, zero latency agent sandboxing

12Distinct people
20Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
4.9KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

agent runtime security - zero trust, zero setup, zero latency agent sandboxing

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 6:28:55 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month20 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-02-01 21:35:04 UTC to 2026-10-22 19:51:42 UTC.

024682026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 8 mentions; 5 submissions, 3 commentsFeb 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 commentsJun 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 commentsOct 2026

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 20262026-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC853
Mar 20262026-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20262026-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20262026-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20262026-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC303
Jul 20262026-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Aug 20262026-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC211
Sep 20262026-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Oct 20262026-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-11-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

2 sources
Git worktrees are a great isolation boundary for _changes_ (especially making changes in parallel on a single machine), but not behavior. If you are trying to actually run autonomous agents securely you need something that lives outside the harness that actually blocks actions in a way that can't be prompted around. We use nono [1] for this internally, essentially blocking any actions we don't want agents to be able to do without human approval. Our developers can just run `task claude` or whatever their harness is) and it pre-wraps it with our profile that enforces: - Filesystem: read/write only the worktree plus dev-tooling dirs (Go, Doppler, Graphite caches, git common dir); explicitly no Docker socket and it can't edit its own Claude settings files (so it can't loosen its own permissions). - Network: outbound only to an allowlist - An
Read the rest
thropic, Doppler, Go module proxies, our dev environments while still allowing binding local dev-server ports. - GitHub: read anything in the org, and create/edit PRs and push branches - but it cannot merge, close, review, or comment on PRs, delete branches, touch repo settings/secrets, manage auth, or use raw gh api. Those are all "human-only". GitHub tokens are never exposed to the agent; they're injected by a proxy so it can't read or exfiltrate them. This is great because it is harness agnostic - any developer can use whatever harness they want as long as they port the nono profile to it, as it will enforce all of the above in a way that is not tied to a specific harness implementation [1] https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono
In Git worktrees are not an isolation boundary for coding agents

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