HackerReposA FIELD GUIDE TO OPEN SOURCE
ProSponsor the shelf♧ 0
← Back to top all-time
openbsd
src
C2016–2026
openbsd / src

src

Read-only git conversion of OpenBSD's CVS src repository. This only includes the main branch; use CVS for -stable or release branches. Send any diffs to the tech@ mailing list.

108Distinct people
146Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
3.9KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Read-only git conversion of OpenBSD's CVS src repository. This only includes the main branch; use CVS for -stable or release branches. Send any diffs to the tech@ mailing list.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 7:02:50 PM UTC.

A live tree of systemd jobs on the boot console direct repository linkDebated

The discussion centers on a visualization tool for systemd boot jobs, which serves as a catalyst for a broader debate regarding systemd's monolithic architecture versus simpler alternatives like OpenRC or Runit. Participants strongly disagree on whether systemd's complexity and aggressive integration are necessary modernizations or detrimental violations of the Unix philosophy that hinder debugging and flexibility.

145 readable replies · Supporting reply 1 · Supporting reply 2 · Supporting reply 3 · Supporting reply 4

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year146 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-10-17 20:24:05 UTC to 2026-10-20 07:38:05 UTC.

01020302016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 11 mentions; 0 submissions, 11 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 0 submissions, 13 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 0 submissions, 13 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 1 submissions, 9 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 13 mentions; 1 submissions, 12 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 32 mentions; 1 submissions, 31 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 16 mentions; 1 submissions, 15 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 10 mentions; 0 submissions, 10 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 14 mentions; 0 submissions, 14 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 12 mentions; 1 submissions, 11 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC11011
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13013
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13013
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC1019
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC13112
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC32131
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC16115
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC10010
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC14014
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC12111

What Hacker News says

13 sources
And considering all the interesting work that OpenBSD is doing to Clang, i.e: retguard [0] [1], ROP gadget reduction framework [2]. Ignoring the fact that two major open source *BSD operating systems use and ship LLVM/Clang as their default system compiler. Their entire system compiled with clang, LLD as the default linker for an increasing number of supported platforms. A ports tree with between 10,000 (OpenBSD) to 30,000 (FreeBSD) ports compiled with Clang, maintaining patches upstreams won't take.. .. You might think that objection would be listened to more readily, or do the interest of a handful of corporations hold greater weight? OpenBSD will undoubtedly be forced to fork LLVM 8, and likely have to take on the burden of asking individual developers to dual-license contributions they backport going forward. This will place them in a
Read the rest
In LLVM Relicensing Effort
I'm not sure there is a reliable, generic approach for detecting overflow in conformant C; you probably have to come up with the appropriate proof for the specific operation that you're about to do. OpenBSD does it for multiplication in reallocarray() [1], which was introduced because it was easy to code an integer overflow when doing something like malloc(sizeof(member) * nmembers). [1] https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/master/lib/libc/stdlib/r...
In Undefined Behavior Is Really Undefined
Nice write up. It reminded me of the time I spent several weeks once trying to get OpenBGPD to work on OpenBSD. First I tried getting some test VMs up and talking to each other. When I couldn't get that to work, I setup a few physical boxes to test it out.. When that didn't work either, I started debugging the code. A few strace's and some routine C debugging work later and I found a bug that would prevent any BGP connection from ever establishing. A quick post on the OpenBSD listserv and the problem was fixed within day. (Wow that was almost 10 years ago?! How time flies) https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/13fba73cec6be16d64c86e... We ultimately went with VyOS (back then called Vyatta) and Quagga but it felt good to find a bug like this. Most of the work went in to confirming that there was an actual bug. Finding out where the
Read the rest
bug was and fixing it was relatively trivial.
In How we spent two weeks hunting an NFS bug in the Linux kernel
OpenBSD's carrying some local patches, Perl rand appears to be using the libc drand48(3) on OpenBSD, which uses arc4random_buf(3) internally, unless Perl srand is called, then it uses srand48_deterministic(3)? Not sure precisely as it's also using arc4random(3) directly to seed something. This is slightly different from how it's handled outside the Perl software ecosystem, as all the srand* functions effectively became nops on OpenBSD in favour of strong random numbers, and userland ports had to be patched to use the deterministic variants if needed. I guess that would be hard with things like CPAN. https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/2e109fb9e8c0dc273648dd... https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/2e109fb9e8c0dc273648dd... https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/2e109fb9e8c0dc273648dd... Looks like upstream Perl also uses drand48 from Fre
Read the rest
eBSD, with its own internal RNG. But I guess this can be overridden with build options. I'd imagine something like pwgen would be better, but I doubt it matters here.
In The setup of OpenBSD Amsterdam
I say it again: This is a kernel mechanism. Every operating system based upon Linux provides programs with this mechanism. This is not some ioctl() introduced by a Debian patch. This is a mechanism added to Linux by Linus Torvalds on 1993-12-23. * http://repo.or.cz/davej-history.git/commitdiff/9d09486414951... Pete French added it to FreeBSD against his better judgement on 2010-01-04. It might have been in an earlier implementation of the terminal line discipline, too. * https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/commit/74b0526bbe6326adb7... OpenBSD, which no longer implements the kernel mechanism, had had it since the initial import from NetBSD in 1995. * https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/df930be708d50e9715f173ca... Illumos has it, and has had since at least the OpenSolaris launch. * https://github.com/illumos/illumos-gate/blob/9a2c4685271c
Read the rest
2f0... It was even in 4.3BSD.
In Ancient “su – hostile” vulnerability in Debian 8 and 9
This is old news, that keeps being reported over and over. Part of the problem, I suspect, is that people keep pointing to the wrong locus of the problem. Even here, this is being characterized as a Debian problem. This is a kernel mechanism. * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-6409 * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6565 * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-2779 * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-7545 * https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-5226 Some kernel people take the view that TIOCSTI is of no Earthly use, and there are other ways to implement line editing, and just make using it an error. * http://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article&sid=20170701132619 * https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/baecf150995d4609cd1479... Others take a different view. * http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/0
Read the rest
In Ancient “su – hostile” vulnerability in Debian 8 and 9
> This triggered my interest to go look at the C source code for linux[1]. Coreutils is not Linux, and GNU tools are notoriously heavyweight. For contrast, here is Toybox implementation of rm: https://github.com/landley/toybox/blob/master/toys/posix/rm.... busybox: https://git.busybox.net/busybox/tree/coreutils/rm.c https://git.busybox.net/busybox/tree/libbb/remove_file.c And finally openbsd: https://github.com/openbsd/src/blob/master/bin/rm/rm.c
In Unraveling rm: what happens when you run it?

MAKE YOURSELF AT HOME

A few shortcuts

/
Search the collection
?
Open this guide
Esc
Close dialogs and navigation

Your saved repositories and interests stay in this browser.