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opencontainers
runtime-spec
Go2015–2026
opencontainers / runtime-spec

runtime-spec

OCI Runtime Specification

18Distinct people
22Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
3.7KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

OCI Runtime Specification

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 8:59:20 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year22 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-06-22 19:13:56 UTC to 2026-01-23 21:50:07 UTC.

02462015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 0 submissions, 5 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 6 mentions; 0 submissions, 6 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC505
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC606
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
You are right, they are not mutually exclusive, and we are working on both in parallel. We are working on specifying a standardized way to 1) hash a container in its runnable form, and 2) attach arbitrary signatures constructed from that hash. That will allow using your favorite existing tools (eg. gpg) to create arbitrary trust and verification systems. This is part of the OCP project, and will be implemented by RunC which we donated last month. See https://github.com/opencontainers/runc and https://github.com/opencontainers/specs . As a rule of thumb, end-to-end trust and naming is most useful to developers ("How do I know I'm building on the right dependency, and using the latest and most secure version?"), and low-level hashing is most useful to ops ("How do I enforce a whitelist of containers allowed on my production cluster based on
Read the rest
home-made PKI and policies?") Another distinction is that you can use Notary (and Docker Trusted Content) with any kind of content - for example Compose files, source artifacts, system packages used to build the container, etc.
In Introducing Docker Content Trust
The proof is in the pudding. Overall this is very positive for the ecosystem as a whole, and glad to see them all come together. But I thought a big selling point of a standard means it's written down, currently the spec returns a 404 on github [1] seems like a lot of unknowns on what's actually being proposed. It’s confusing why the App Container (appc) spec which is written down [2] and has maintainers from RedHat, Twitter, Google, Apcera, CoreOS [3] is not being promoted - what's the new OCP standard offering that isn't in the appc spec? [1] https://github.com/opencontainers/specs [2] https://github.com/appc/spec [3] http://www.infoq.com/news/2015/05/appc-spec-gains-support
In Docker, CoreOS, Google, Microsoft, Amazon to Develop Common Container Standard

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