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OWASP
ASVS
HTML2015–2025
OWASP / ASVS

ASVS

Application Security Verification Standard

7Distinct people
10Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
3.8KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Application Security Verification Standard

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

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This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year10 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-07-03 16:28:35 UTC to 2025-10-22 19:49:40 UTC.

0122015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 1 submissions, 1 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC211
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202

What Hacker News says

10 sources
Also, I gave the link to the appendix because there was a specific question about Argon2 parameters. For general developer audiences, they need to look at the standard itself which is a lot more high level about how to properly implement cryptography in software: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/5.0/en/0x20-V11-Cr... For the most common use-cases of cryptography like authentication and secure communication there is more specific, but still high level guidance that is useful for developers as well: - https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/5.0/en/0x21-V12-Se... - https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/5.0/en/0x18-V9-Sel... - https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/5.0/en/0x15-V6-Aut...
In Evaluating Argon2 adoption and effectiveness in real-world software
What are the other potential problems of the "email is authentication" pattern, under the following prescribed conditions? Maybe just these two? (Prescribed Conditions) - "Credential Recovery" complies with OWASP ASVS and is "adequately secure". - "Credential Recovery" is the "weakest link" of authentication. (Other authentication methods require TOTP, etc.) (Potential Problems) - The financial cost of sending emails. - my guess is that, since I could not find of news of this issue, these users are only a small percentage (hopeful not yet) - End-to-end response time for the "Credential Recovery" authentication process - my guess is that users who choose "Credential Recovery" authentication over other "happy-path" authentication are willing to wait, or are use to waiting. (Non-problems) - If the above conditions are
Read the rest
specified, authentication security is not compromised. (Terms) - "Credential Recovery" as in OWASP ASVS V2.5 Credential Recovery, or "Self-service password reset" as in Wikipedia, or "forgot password" flow. https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Self-service_pass... https://owasp.org/www-project-application-security-verificat... https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/raw/v4.0.3/4.0/OWASP%20Applica... - "adequately secure" as in NIST SP 800-160 Vol. 1 Rev. 1, 3. System Security Concepts, 3.2. The Concept of an Adequately Secure System. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/160/v1/r1/final https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.S...
In The "email is authentication" pattern
The FBI feeds data into Troy Hunt's database and FBI Director Christopher Wray gave Troy Hunt a medal for his work [1]. The Open Web Application Security Project's Application Security Verification Standard recommends that you do a hashed password check [2]. For bigger companies, sure, go talk to legal, but for young startups, my feeling is it's not worth the $200 or whatever your counsel will charge to say it's ok. I personally did not ask anyone (am cto), I just added the check. 1. https://twitter.com/troyhunt/status/1674132801837477888 2. See OWASP ASVS 4.0 2.1.7 https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/4.0/en/0x11-V2-Aut...
In A decade of Have I Been Pwned
"Strict Identifier Verification" look kind of like CWE-304. CWE-304: Missing Critical Step in Authentication <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/304.html> Looking at the CWE-304 wording, this does not look like the right CWE, but OWASP ASVP 2.2.2 points to this CWE. OWASP ASVP 2.2.2 <https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/v4.0.3_release/4.0/en/0x1...> 2.2.2 Verify that the use of weak authenticators (such as SMS and email) is limited to secondary verification and transaction approval and not as a replacement for more secure authentication methods. Verify that stronger methods are offered before weak methods, users are aware of the risks, or that proper measures are in place to limit the risks of account compromise. CWE-304
In Dozens of high-traffic websites vulnerable to ‘account pre-hijacking’, study
possibly CWE-306? CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html> Looking at the CWE-306 wording, this does not look like the right CWE, but OWASP ASVP 3.7.1 points to this CWE. OWASP ASVP 3.7.1 <https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/v4.0.3_release/4.0/en/0x1...> 3.7.1 Verify the application ensures a full, valid login session or requires re-authentication or secondary verification before allowing any sensitive transactions or account modifications. CWE-306
In Dozens of high-traffic websites vulnerable to ‘account pre-hijacking’, study
linsomniac·Aug 9, 2019Submission

Ask HN: How do you “verify” app security?

We are currently going through the OWASP "Application Security Verification Standard" ( https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS ) to increase security of an existing web app. Many of the items in that checklist are "verify X". To me, when it says "Verify requests to uploaded files will never be executed as HTML/JavaScript", that means spend hours visiting every place where files may be uploaded, find the corresponding download, and check the code to make sure it won't be interpreted as HTML/JS. There are 132 items just in the "L1" part of the standard (the minimum recommended protections), which seems like it could be thousands of hours to "verify" all of those. But the OWASP ASVS says that half the things in L1 are probably automatically testable or testable in the CI/CD pipeline. Clearly we don't want to manually verify all these things, as that
Read the rest
doesn't prevent drift as time goes on. But we also don't have a process that would automate any of this. It seems like having access to request logs would allow us to identify many things (like whether API tokens are exposed in URLs) and access to live production data streams as they go through the load balancer would allow us to detect file uploads and content types sent back. But I'm unaware of tools for doing that. Cloudflare has their "web application firewall", which probably helps some with this on an ongoing basis, I think that starts at $5K/month. AWS has a WAF as well, and you can purchase subscriptions to rules for checking traffic, and some of those mention OWASP. Right now we are going over OWASP doing some "gut feel" what items are the highest priority and are likely to be vulnerable to. We've also been looking at code and finding some definite security issues. But longer term we need to present to non-technical board members why we aren't scanning all file uploads with A/V software, for example. Anyone have any wisdom on how you are "verifying" compliance with security standards?
1 points · Open discussion
OWASP Foundation: We are in the last stretches of reviewing the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 3.0, to be released at AppSec USA in September. If you are an application lead, lead developer, developer, tester, pen tester, code reviewer, or auditor, please review the draft here: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/OWASP%20Applicatio... We would also appreciate if you could pass this draft onto software engineers, practitioners, developers, CISOs, and architects. Please log any discovered issues here: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/issues
In OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 3.0
armab·Jul 3, 2015Submission

OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 3.0

OWASP Foundation: We are in the last stretches of reviewing the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 3.0, to be released at AppSec USA in September. If you are an application lead, lead developer, developer, tester, pen tester, code reviewer, or auditor, please review the draft here: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/master/OWASP%20Application%20Security%20Verific… We would also appreciate if you could pass this draft onto software engineers, practitioners, developers, CISOs, and architects. Please log any discovered issues here: https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/issues
5 points · Open discussion

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