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P-H-C
phc-winner-argon2
C2016–2024
P-H-C / phc-winner-argon2

phc-winner-argon2

The password hash Argon2, winner of PHC

15Distinct people
17Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
5.4KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

The password hash Argon2, winner of PHC

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 9:01:12 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year17 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-01-08 05:31:47 UTC to 2024-04-12 00:50:12 UTC.

02468102016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 9 mentions; 1 submissions, 8 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2024

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC918
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

1 sources
I agree, but you literally have no other option: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/SubtleCrypt... Web cryptography is stuck in the 1990s. PBKDF2 is the only available algorithm, which gives an attacker's GPUs a big advantage over honest users, let alone ASICs. Maybe a webassembly-based solution, implementing something like Bcrypt or Scrypt/Argon2, is comparable to a browser-native implementation, but that would have to be verified before taking my word for it. These algorithms provide varying amounts of memory-hardness (Bcrypt only 4KB but even that proved surprisingly effective), which causes contention on the GPU memory bus (they're only a bit faster than the CPU's memory bus, making the GPU have only a small advantage, on the order of 5x instead of 100x) and causes larger ASIC die sizes (which the Argon2 paper argues is
Read the rest
what causes cost for the attacker). Source for the latter: https://github.com/P-H-C/phc-winner-argon2/blob/16d3df698db2... section 2.1 > We aim to maximize the cost of password cracking on ASICs. There can be different approaches to measure this cost, but we turn to one of the most popular – the time-area product [4, 16]. [...] > - The 50-nm DRAM implementation [10] takes 550 mm² per GByte; > - The Blake2b implementation in the 65-nm process should take about 0.1 mm² (using Blake-512 implementation in [11]); I understand from this that adding more memory on the ASIC/chip is more expensive than adding more computing power.
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