paseto-spec

> Blame the library, or its defaults. Every JWT proponent says that, but it's a misuse that shows up in multiple libraries, in multiple languages, and isn't explicitly called out in the JWT Best Practices RFC at all. I'm going to blame the standard for being error-prone. There's nothing in any JWT RFC, to date, that calls out the need for cryptographic keys to be the raw key material in addition to its parameter choices, rather than just the raw key material. That's a fault of the standard. That's not a single library's fault. That's the standard's fault. PASETO has this to say: https://github.com/paseto-standard/paseto-spec/blob/master/d... > As for the key ID attack, this sounds like it's just a trick to know where the private key is located? It shouldn't be publicly accessible. This doesn't involve private keys at all. Look at the proo