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Percivalll
Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kubernetes-PoC
C2026–2026
Percivalll / Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kubernetes-PoC

Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kubernetes-PoC

PoC: fully unprivileged container escape to node-level code execution on Kubernetes via CVE-2026-31431 page-cache corruption + shared image layers. Validated on Alibaba Cloud ACK, Amazon EKS and Google GKE.

4Distinct people
4Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
195GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

PoC: fully unprivileged container escape to node-level code execution on Kubernetes via CVE-2026-31431 page-cache corruption + shared image layers. Validated on Alibaba Cloud ACK, Amazon EKS and Google GKE.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by hour4 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-05-07 21:01:40 UTC to 2026-05-08 14:12:01 UTC.

012026-05-07 21:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-07 22:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMay 7, 21:002026-05-07 22:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-07 23:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-07 23:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 01:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-05-08 01:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 02:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 02:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 03:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 03:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 04:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 04:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 05:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 05:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 06:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsMay 8, 05:002026-05-08 06:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 07:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 07:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 08:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 08:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 09:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 09:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 10:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 10:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 11:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 11:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 12:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 12:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 13:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-05-08 13:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 14:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-05-08 14:00:00 UTC to 2026-05-08 15:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsMay 8, 14:00

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
May 7, 21:002026-05-07 21:00:00 UTC2026-05-07 22:00:00 UTC101
May 7, 22:002026-05-07 22:00:00 UTC2026-05-07 23:00:00 UTC000
May 7, 23:002026-05-07 23:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 00:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 00:002026-05-08 00:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 01:00:00 UTC101
May 8, 01:002026-05-08 01:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 02:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 02:002026-05-08 02:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 03:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 03:002026-05-08 03:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 04:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 04:002026-05-08 04:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 05:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 05:002026-05-08 05:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 06:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 06:002026-05-08 06:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 07:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 07:002026-05-08 07:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 08:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 08:002026-05-08 08:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 09:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 09:002026-05-08 09:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 10:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 10:002026-05-08 10:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 11:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 11:002026-05-08 11:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 12:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 12:002026-05-08 12:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 13:00:00 UTC000
May 8, 13:002026-05-08 13:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 14:00:00 UTC101
May 8, 14:002026-05-08 14:00:00 UTC2026-05-08 15:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

4 sources
This is kind of an odd article to me. The point that podman may provide better isolation that Docker is made, but copy fail part focuses on the sample exploit (that overwrote su) which is not super applicable to containerised environments, and not the general effect of exploiting the vulnerability, which is to allow the user to overwrite a file that they should only have read-only access to. https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber... - This PoC has a good example of how Copy Fail might have an impact in a container based environment, it's exploiting the shared layers in a pair of container images, to overwrite a file in one image based on the running of an exploit in another. Whilst I've not directly tested podman for that kind of attack, I'd be a bit surprised if it stopped it, given how this vuln works.
In Podman rootless containers and the Copy Fail exploit
With the exploits published as-is, you'll only get root inside the container: there's no explicit namespace break, and calling setuid() in a container just gives you root in the container. However, it can be used to modify files that are passed into the container (e.g. Docker run -v), or files that are shared with other containers (e.g. other Docker containers sharing the same layers). kube-proxy with Kubernetes happens to share a trusted binary with containers by default, which is how it can be exploited: https://github.com/Percivalll/Copy-Fail-CVE-2026-31431-Kuber...
In Dirtyfrag: Universal Linux LPE

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