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phylum-dev
birdcage
Rust2022–2025
phylum-dev / birdcage · Archived

birdcage

Cross-platform embeddable sandboxing

2Distinct people
15Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
219GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Cross-platform embeddable sandboxing

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 8–Nov 15 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/15/2026, 2:59:53 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by month15 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2022-11-02 17:54:24 UTC to 2025-01-31 18:07:00 UTC.

012342022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 commentsNov 20222022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsDec 20232024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsJan 2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Nov 20222022-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC404
Dec 20222022-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jan 20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Feb 20232023-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20232023-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Apr 20232023-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20232023-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20232023-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20232023-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-08-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Aug 20232023-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-09-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Sep 20232023-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-10-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Oct 20232023-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20232023-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20232023-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
Jan 20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 20242024-02-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Mar 20242024-03-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC202
Apr 20242024-04-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC000
May 20242024-05-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jun 20242024-06-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jul 20242024-07-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Aug 20242024-08-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Sep 20242024-09-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Oct 20242024-10-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Nov 20242024-11-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Dec 20242024-12-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
Jan 20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-02-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
One of the sources referenced in the paper is about the work the company I co-founded is doing (https://phylum.io). We've been working closely with PyPI to not only report issues related to malware, but are also helping provide guidance around on-going work to help curb additional malware in the ecosystem. I think this is a step in the right direction, and one I hope other ecosystems will eventually take. Though, this is likely to be a cat and mouse game for the foreseeable future. Detection will get better, and attackers will change tactics. In the meantime, we've been open-sourcing some tooling to help protect developers from these sorts of attacks. Namely, a sandbox that locks down network/disk/env [1] and our CLI [2] that allows you to perform a `pip` install in the sandbox, after checking our API for behaviors/issues with the package
Read the rest
. For example: phylum pip install <pkgName> Really glad to see software supply chain security getting some academic, rigorous study. Backstabbers Knife was one of the first I came across, and it's been a consistent stream of papers since. 1. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage 2. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli
In A study of malicious code in PyPI ecosystem
Happy to see this on HN! I'm one of the co-founders @ Phylum. We actively monitor and report on malware and software supply chain attacks across multiple ecosystems. Most notably, we were the first to identify and report on attacks carried out by North Korean state actors in NPM [1], prevented an early typosquat campaign against Rust developers on crates.io [2] and recently a faux email validation utility with a fairly complicated attack chain [3]. We've been monitoring npm the longest, and while I wouldn't classify this particular attack as complex or sophisticated, it's interesting in that it continues the trend of targeting build systems (and more generally, developers). Our goal is to help clean up as many of these registries as possible, and to provide developers with the tooling to better protect themselves from attack. In doing so,
Read the rest
we're open sourcing as many things as we can. We recently open sourced our sandbox [4] that helps lock down disk/networking/env during process execution and have baked this into our open source cli so you can do things like: phylum npm install <pkg> To be clear, this particular package did not execute code during install, so the sandbox wouldn't have come into play, but it would have been blocked by the pre-check against Phylum's API. Would greatly appreciate any feedback on our extensions and suggestions for improving our sandbox! We recently had a few individuals submit some great issues and suggestions, which we absolutely loved receiving. Happy to answer any questions about software supply chain attacks or security in general! 1. https://blog.phylum.io/junes-sophisticated-npm-attack-attrib... 2. https://blog.phylum.io/rust-malware-staged-on-crates-io/ 3. https://blog.phylum.io/npm-emails-validator-package-malware/ 4. https://github.com/phylum-dev/birdcage 5. https://github.com/phylum-dev/cli
In Cryptocurrency Miner Masquerading as GCC Compiler Found in NPM Package

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