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pion
dtls
Go2020–2026
pion / dtls

dtls

DTLS 1.2 / 1.3 implementation for Go

3Distinct people
7Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
714GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

DTLS 1.2 / 1.3 implementation for Go

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 9–Nov 16 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/16/2026, 4:59:52 AM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year7 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2020-04-21 08:22:53 UTC to 2026-10-16 20:59:02 UTC.

01232020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20232024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110

What Hacker News says

1 sources
JoTurk·Oct 16, 2026Submission

Tell HN: Anthropic found 36 bugs (6 CVEs) in Pion, OpenAI missed them

We added Pion DTLS to Anthropic's OSS scanner last week (https://github.com/anthropics/oss-scanner/pull/93), and today we woke up to a report with 36 bugs, including 6 security vulnerabilities: 2 critical, 3 high, and 1 moderate. Four of them affect WebRTC. Some of these vulnerabilities have been sitting in the codebase for over 4 years, surviving years of testing and security scans. It's funny that our inboxes are constantly spammed with AI-generated security reports from people using Codex and Claude, most of which flag pointless issues. Yet somehow, none of them caught these. The funniest part? Anthropic also found 3 bugs that OpenAI's internal code review missed. I had asked OpenAI to review a new DTLS API since they use Pion and had a use case for it in SPED. Their review didn't flag any bugs. Anthropic found an authentication issue,
Read the rest
a deadlock, and a TLS KeyUpdate bug (Maybe their model ignored this one because it's not a WebRTC issue). Luckily, the API hasn't been released yet. The fixes: https://github.com/pion/dtls/pull/1236 Here are the security advisories for the CVEs Anthropic found (all of them are pre-chatgpt!): Critical: DTLS handshake signature confusion allows peer impersonation - https://github.com/pion/dtls/security/advisories/GHSA-7c2r-jhm9-43vf Critical: Client authentication bypass through premature session caching - https://github.com/pion/dtls/security/advisories/GHSA-hhpj-h56m-9f2p High: Client authentication bypass with shared session stores - https://github.com/pion/dtls/security/advisories/GHSA-cqhp-ggp7-58qj High: Unbounded handshake cache allows remote memory exhaustion - https://github.com/pion/dtls/security/advisories/GHSA-jm57-r6vj-mwg9 High: Oversized RSA keys allow CPU exhaustion - https://github.com/pion/dtls/security/advisories/GHSA-jp25-wc3w-p9xp Moderate: Repeated certificate verification allows CPU exhaustion - https://github.com/pion/dtls/security/advisories/GHSA-qpgj-64qg-5m4r The most annoying part is that neither company's models were willing to help with verifying or filtering the bugs, so we had to manually review them one by one (Spent all day :/
8 points · Open discussion

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