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pipelab-org
pipelock
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pipelab-org / pipelock

pipelock

Open-source AI agent firewall for MCP security and agent egress. Scans mediated HTTP, MCP, A2A, and WebSocket traffic for exfiltration, SSRF, and prompt injection, and emits mediator-signed action receipts: verifiable audit evidence from outside the agent.

2Distinct people
2Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
990GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Open-source AI agent firewall for MCP security and agent egress. Scans mediated HTTP, MCP, A2A, and WebSocket traffic for exfiltration, SSRF, and prompt injection, and emits mediator-signed action receipts: verifiable audit evidence from outside the agent.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:03:16 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by day2 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2026-02-10 12:41:38 UTC to 2026-02-27 15:50:51 UTC.

012026-02-10 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-11 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsFeb 102026-02-11 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-12 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-12 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-13 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-13 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-14 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-14 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-15 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-15 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-17 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-17 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-18 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-18 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-19 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 commentsFeb 182026-02-19 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-20 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-20 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-21 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-21 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-22 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-22 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-24 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-24 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-25 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-25 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-26 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-26 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-27 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2026-02-27 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-02-28 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 commentsFeb 27

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
Feb 102026-02-10 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-11 00:00:00 UTC101
Feb 112026-02-11 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-12 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 122026-02-12 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-13 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 132026-02-13 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-14 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 142026-02-14 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-15 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 152026-02-15 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 162026-02-16 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-17 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 172026-02-17 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-18 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 182026-02-18 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-19 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 192026-02-19 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-20 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 202026-02-20 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-21 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 212026-02-21 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-22 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 222026-02-22 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 232026-02-23 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-24 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 242026-02-24 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-25 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 252026-02-25 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-26 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 262026-02-26 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-27 00:00:00 UTC000
Feb 272026-02-27 00:00:00 UTC2026-02-28 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

2 sources
The automated audit only covers static analysis. When the agent actually runs, hitting MCP servers, making HTTP calls, getting responses back, that's where the real problems show up. Prompt injection through tool responses, malicious libraries that exfiltrate env vars, SSRF from agents that blindly follow redirects. Code audits miss all of it because this is a runtime and network problem, not a code quality problem. Built Pipelock for this actually. It's a network proxy that sits between the agent and everything it talks to. Still early but the gap is real. https://github.com/luckyPipewrench/pipelock
In AI-Generated Products Won't Trigger a SaaSpocalypse

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