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pypa
twine
Python2016–2025
pypa / twine

twine

Utilities for interacting with PyPI

5Distinct people
5Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
1.8KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Utilities for interacting with PyPI

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year5 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2016-08-27 15:05:06 UTC to 2025-01-21 07:38:31 UTC.

012016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20162017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

5 sources
Well, I think there should be broader discussion of this inadequacy. "Implement "hook" support for package signature verification." (2013) https://github.com/pypi/warehouse/issues/1638#issuecomment-2... "GPG signing - how does that really work with PyPI?" https://github.com/pypa/twine/issues/157#issuecomment-101460... "Better integration with conda/conda-forge for building packages" https://github.com/pyodide/pyodide/issues/795#issuecomment-1... Conda now has their own package cryptographic signature software supply chain security control control. Unfortunately, conda's isn't yet W3D DIDs with Verifiable Credentials and sigstore either. Also, [CycloneDX] SBOMs don't have any package archive or package file signatures; so when you try to audit what software you have on all the containers on your infrastructure there's no way to check the
Read the rest
cryptographic signatures of the package authors and maintainers against what's installed on disk. docker help sbom # check_signatures python conda zipapps apt/dnf/brew/chocolatey_nuget git /usr/local And without clients signing before uploading, we can only verify Data Integrity (1) at the package archive level; (2) with pypi's package signature key.
In Removing PGP from PyPI
Twine[0] is the tool I've been using for PyPI archive management and Pipenv[1] is looking promising as the next iteration of pip. Twine makes the packaging process _slightly_ easier, although setuptools is still a bit of a pain. Pipenv handles a lot of project cruft for you: setting up a virtualenv, distinguishing dev and prod packages, locking them down and deterministic building. [0]: https://github.com/pypa/twine [1]: https://github.com/kennethreitz/pipenv
In What would a python pip replacement look like?
> The top result from Google: https://pypi.python.org/security I'm not sure what this has to do with anything. Yes, you may sign your uploads. Nobody verifies them on download. Since you seem to be a fan of Google, try Googling 'pip signature verification' and reading the results. Here's one place to start: https://github.com/pypa/twine/issues/157 > Really? So how do you install Babel the first time in order to shrinkwrap it? The same way you install anything else from any other ecosystem? The packages have to be up and online when you initially retrieve them, yes. I have no idea how you think that's NPM-specific. If you would like to download some code, you have to have somewhere to download it from.
In “Node.js is one of the worst things to happen to the software industry” (2012)

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