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quay
clair
Go2015–2024
quay / clair

clair

Vulnerability Static Analysis for Containers

18Distinct people
21Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
11.1KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

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What it is

Vulnerability Static Analysis for Containers

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use was verified in the last source check.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

Mentioned in the same Hacker News threads. That is not proof they are substitutes.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 12:54:37 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year21 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2015-11-13 23:44:38 UTC to 2024-01-28 18:29:54 UTC.

0123452015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments20152016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 5 mentions; 1 submissions, 4 comments2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 4 mentions; 0 submissions, 4 comments2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 1 submissions, 0 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2024

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20152015-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20162016-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC514
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC404
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC110
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

21 sources
Besides pointing pentester tools like metasploit at yourself, there are some nice scanners out there. Examples in no particular order: https://github.com/quay/clair https://github.com/anchore/grype/ https://github.com/eliasgranderubio/dagda/ https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy So then you set up something like a cron job to scan everything for you and email the results once a week or whatever if you don't want to monitor things actively.
In I looked through attacks in my access logs
We used the "WITH RECURSIVE" basically the moment it shipped in Postgres for the original CoreOS Clair[0] data model which was a graph of software versions and vulnerabilities. It scaled well compared to a naive graph abstraction implemented outside the database, but when performance wasn't great, it REALLY wasn't great. After running that version in production for a couple years, we ended up throwing it out and remodeling the domain to be less graph-y to achieve more consistent performance. I've since worked on SpiceDB[1] which scales much better by taking the traditional design approach for graph databases and only treating Postgres as triple-store. IME, there's no short-cut: if you need a graph, you probably want to use a database optimized for graph access patterns. Most general-purpose graph databases are full of optimizations for co
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mmon traversals that are uncommon operations in relation databases. [0]: https://github.com/quay/clair [1]: https://github.com/authzed/spicedb
In Postgres as a graph database
I didn't know ipfs cluster existed -- thanks for the reference. I was more thinking of a harbor[0] like cobbling of these technologies together -- harbor combines a bunch of F/OSS tools into one powerful registry solution. Here are a few: - Distribution for storing images - Notary for signing - Clair for static analysis Based on this I was thinking of was basically Distribution + ipfs cluster + a small management daemon. The daemon is only there to tie the other pieces together and present a unified interface but the bulk of the work can be done with the other pieces. [0]: https://github.com/goharbor/harbor/wiki/Architecture-Overvie... [1]: https://github.com/docker/distribution [2]: https://github.com/theupdateframework/notary [3]: https://github.com/coreos/clair
In Kraken, an Open Source Peer-to-Peer Docker Registry
There is an entire genre of such tools now. Some names to look up are BlackDuck Hub[0] (commercial) and CoreOS Clair[1] (opensource). At Pivotal we use both -- BlackDuck is built into a number of our pipelines and Clair is shipped as part of PKS (in the Harbor registry[2] contributed by VMWare). A lot of our customers also use other security scanning tools that have expanded to include container scanning. [0] https://www.blackducksoftware.com/products/hub [1] https://github.com/coreos/clair [2] https://github.com/vmware/harbor
In How the modern containerization trend is exploited by attackers
This is something near and dear to my heart! The great thing about container images is the software distribution is based on static assets. This enables scanners to give teams actionable data without being on every host. This is a net new capability and I think enables better security in organizations who adopt containers. And unlike "VM sprawl" container systems are generally introspectable via a cluster level API like Kubernetes and scanning doesn't require active agents on every node. Two things that have happened recently in this space: - Quay.io[1] offers scanning as a standard feature on all accounts including free open source accounts. This also includes notifications to external services like Slack. This is what it looks like when you ignore an image[1]. - The Kubernetes community has started automating scans of all of the contain
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ers that are maintained by that community to ensure that they are patched and bumped to the latest versions. A recent example[2]. The cool thing is that both of these systems utilize Clair[3] Open Source Project as a way of gathering up data sources from all of the various distribution projects. This all leads to the reason we feel automated updates of distributed systems are so critical and why CoreOS continues to push forward these concepts in CoreOS Tectonic[4]. [0] https://blog.quay.io/quay-secscanner-clair1/ [1] https://quay.io/repository/philips/host-info?tag=latest&tab=... [2] https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/pull/42933 [3] https://github.com/coreos/clair [4] https://coreos.com/tectonic
In Docker Image Vulnerability Research

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