qubes-issues

wikipedia.org/wiki/Virt-manager) if desired. In short though, secureblue and Qubes aren't really analogous. We have different goals and target use cases. There is even an open issue on Qubes to add a template to use secureblue as a guest: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/9755

s/#reasons-fo... and https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/how-to-install-software-in-dom0... > I hardly see any effort in documenting the fact that individual VMs's security matter too https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/4233 Also, Kicksecure template is already available: https://forum.qubes-os.org/t/kicksecure-template-for-qubes-t...

a/ > Furthermore, the operating systems running inside maintain the same characteristics as typical Linux distributions You misinterpret the Qubes' approach to security. If your VM is compromised, no hardening will save your data (https://xkcd.com/1200/). I'm not using the same VM for everything but dedicated VMs for bank, email, HN, instant messaging and so on. A malware on a random website would only get the access to an empty VM, nothing more. On Qubes, you should compartmentalize your digital live into security domains, such that you never run anything untrusted in trusted ones and never have anything valuable in untrusted ones. With such approach, hardening is irrelevant. More examples: https://www.qubes-os.org/news/2022/10/28/how-to-organize-you.... See also: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/9717#issuecom.... I'm not saying that hardening is useless (Qubes developers are working on it), but it's a much lower improvement in security compared with the first step, i.e., compartmentalization. > Regarding the elevator pitches provided Thanks for the critic of my elevator pitches. > The system's fundamental security considerations could benefit from more detailed explanation. Indeed, a link like this, https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/architecture/, might be good to add. > makes claims such as being "better than physical air-gap," though in practice it operates at the virtualization level Yes, it operates at virtualization level, what's wrong with that? Unless your airgapped computer doesn't exchange files with other computers at all, you are vulnerable to attacks. The linked document shows a detailed explanation of the threat model and when virtualization is more secure. See also: https://www.qubes-os.org/faq/#how-does-qubes-os-compare-to-u... > The suggestion to store passwords in plain text (even in cases of Xen escape, offline status wouldn't provide protection, and storing in plain text presents risks) might lead to misconceptions about security. Last time a relevant escape (affecting the current Qubes architecture) was found in 2006 by the Qubes founder: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Pill_%28software%29