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rebuy-de
aws-nuke
Go2020–2024
rebuy-de / aws-nuke · Archived

aws-nuke

Nuke a whole AWS account and delete all its resources.

11Distinct people
11Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
5.8KGitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Nuke a whole AWS account and delete all its resources.

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 5:04:57 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year11 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2020-06-30 23:55:18 UTC to 2024-08-16 22:35:30 UTC.

01232020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 2 mentions; 0 submissions, 2 comments20202021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 1 submissions, 2 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 2 submissions, 1 comments2024

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC202
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC312
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC321

What Hacker News says

11 sources
To give this a slightly different spin: --> "The best optimization is simply not spinning things up!" At least for local development and testing, as made possible by LocalStack (https://localstack.cloud), among other local testing solutions and emulators. We've seen so many teams fall into the trap of "someone forgot to shut down dev resource X for a week and now we've racked up a $$$ bill on AWS". What is everyone's strategy to avoid this kind of situation? Tools like `aws-nuke` (https://github.com/rebuy-de/aws-nuke) are awesome (!) to clean up unused resources, but frankly they should not be necessary in the first place...
In Cutting down AWS cost by $150k per year simply by shutting things off
> I'm terrified of the literally infinite bill that might show up from a typo a month down the line Whilst this might sound funny, we were surprised to see it as a common use-cases with users putting https://github.com/infracost/infracost in their CI/CD pipelines to act as safety net. Currently it only works for Terraform users, but we plan to add other infra-as-code tools in the future. We're also discussing how we can do this for people who don't use infra-as-code in https://github.com/infracost/infracost/issues/840 but it's not clear what the workflow could look like for them. Perhaps having separate AWS accounts with a budget alert that emails you to run https://github.com/rebuy-de/aws-nuke is a work-around just now. (I'm co-founder of Infracost)
In AWS now allows customers to pay for their usage in advance
yes. there are tools out there that can wipe away everything: https://github.com/rebuy-de/aws-nuke My money is that this guy was just negligent an did not remove his old credentials + used whatever thing he was using before without doublechecking. It's extremely plausible he had this setup for a test account and ran it with the wrong credentials. On Cisco side this bad all around. Revoke the credentials. Audit the credentials periodically. Don't allow direct production access even for engineers that work there unless it's a live production issue or a deployment that's going on (and even then you allow them access to the tooling that does the deployment not to run whatever they want with : permissions)
In Engineer admits he wiped 456 Cisco WebEx VMs from AWS after leaving

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