chvote-1-0

> Geneva doesn't want to bear the costs anymore. Which is doubly unfortunate because their implementation was released under the AGPL[1]; now it's the only one that is any kind of free software at all. The Swiss Post, however, only gives the minimum possible license grant (that also requires you to sign up)[2] that applicable law[3] mandates. [1] https://github.com/republique-et-canton-de-geneve/chvote-1-0... [2] https://www.post.ch/-/media/post/evoting/dokumente/nutzungsb... sections 6 and 7: You cannot even redistribute the code! [3] https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/20132343/...

It's quite easy to make them disappear or bulk fill them. Like bank notes, paper ballots can be counterfeited. Canton of Geneva have open sourced their voting app. https://github.com/republique-et-canton-de-geneve/chvote-1-0 Of course there will never be a perfect way. However, I have a feeling that by multiplying voting methods, fraud impact can be contained. Mail vote increases the number of people voting and have the same positive effect (drowning a fraud in valid results).

Most interesting document of CHVote documentation is this one https://github.com/republique-et-canton-de-geneve/chvote-1-0... At the moment, the open sourced part is the "offline administration application" in the green box at the top right. https://github.com/republique-et-canton-de-geneve/chvote-1-0...

Let's see what they make of this pull request: https://github.com/republique-et-canton-de-geneve/chvote-1-0...

While I appreciate the effort of putting it open-source, and even more to do it on GitHub, I hope they will hire someone who knows how to use Git/GitHub, like using tags for versioning instead of repository name [0], or using meaningful commit messages [1]. For the future let's see how they will manage external contributions. Opening the code for transparency is a good point (even if this still doesn't ensure you that the same version of the code is running in production on trusted hardware), but doing this on GitHub will certainly bring some contributions. Will they refuse everything? Or accept external contributions? Will they use GitHub as the central development process? If not how are they going to handle the development in intern in regards with external contributions? Also are they going to do all commits with this dedicated state-

The system overview is in the github repo here: https://github.com/republique-et-canton-de-geneve/chvote-1-0... For me, they haven't fixed the problem GUN.FREE highlighted when they decided to shut down (https://www.gnu.org/software/free/), but they have highlighted the risks and made them harder to exploit. I need to sit down and think about attack vectors properly, as the process is quite convoluted, but it seems to me there are multiple opportunities for key personnel to change votes and to identify whom voted for each outcome - the scope is limited, and within a very small step due to ballot shuffling, but it definitely is there on a first read-through.