hunter-dkim

> OpenTimestamps alone can not currently prove anything because TLS session keys are symmetric. Timestamps can prove that the data existed prior to there being a known reason to modify it. While that's not as good as direct signing, that's often still enough to be very useful. The statement that OTS "can not currently prove anything" is incorrect. A really good example of this is the Hunter Biden email verification. I used OpenTimestamps to prove that the DKIM key that signed the email was in fact used by Google at the time, by providing a Google-signed email that had been timestamped years ago: https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hunter-dkim/tree/main/o... That's convincing evidence, because it's highly implausible that I would have been working to fake Hunter's emails years before they even came up as an election issue.

Most people have no way to more-deeply authenticate those emails because you didn't provide headers. Many people, myself included, would love some way to better-rule-out whether parts of the messages had been elided, for example. A DKIM signature would have been a perfect integrity check of the message. It's just good protocol. As a result of timestamping emails with their DKIM into Bitcoin, now even rotated, broken, or released keys can be used to partially authenticate e.g. Google messages. You can see this for example in this project here: https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hunter-dkim And in particular, here: https://github.com/robertdavidgraham/hunter-dkim/pull/5 So you see, even historical DKIM signatures can act as strong authentication.