staticrypt

Yep, looks great! If I had known about it at the time I might not have written StatiCrypt. I added it to the "Alternatives to StatiCrypt"[1] section of the Readme years ago when I discovered it :) [1] https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt#alternatives-to-s...

Thanks for the feedback! We had an issue opened around that topic where it seems to me that the weak points of CBC do not apply in the context of StatiCrypt. If you have more thoughts on this I'd love to hear them. Relevant comment here: https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt/issues/19#issueco...

Hi HN! Author of the tool here. Just woke up to a few emails pointing me to this thread. Thanks for the interest and added eyeballs! I'll answer some of the comments here and address the newly opened issues during the day. To answer a few questions that seem common skimming this thread: * CBC vs GCM: we had a conversation regarding this topic where it seemed CBC weaknesses do not apply in StatiCrypt context. I'd love to hear your thoughts if you have any - issue is here[1]. * WebCrypto: I've been wanting to use WebCrypto instead of crypto-js for years now. It's been in my "Important but not urgent" bucket (since crypto-js should be secure too), the interface is different so I want to make sure I do it correctly and life happened, so I never got farther than drafts. Thank you for the PRs, I hope to get to it soon! * "static" means no serv

https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt#encrypting-multip... > This allows encrypting multiple page on a single domain with the same password This might still work for you if putting everything on one page isn't a requirement. Using the "remember me" checkbox means the user only has to input this password once.

The readme links to this issue wrt that decision https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt/issues/19 It seems that the hmac validation makes the GCM unnecessary in their thread model

The linked readme agrees with that https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt#is-it-secure

The downside to this method is that since the resulting cryptographic hash and salt have to be in the resulting file, so there is nothing stopping someone from pulling the hash/salt out and bruteforcing it locally (as opposed to being able to ratelimit login attempts on a server) if they are so inclined and have the required resources.. which may not be that much in the way of resources as the tool uses 1000 iterations of PBKDF2[1]. This is magnitudes lower than what OWASP recommends[2]. I wouldn't personally put anything you want secure behind this. [1]: https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt/blob/5dac008ba644... [2]: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Password_Stor...

I'm not a cryptographer, but I'm pretty sure that CBC (https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt/blob/main/lib/cry...) should be replaced with GCM (https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/SubtleCrypt...) since this is not a stream. https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/184305/why-woul... (also, use the built-in WebCrypto API instead of the crypto-js package)

For anyone else wondering what the KDF is, it appears to be PBKDF2 with 1000 iterations: https://github.com/robinmoisson/staticrypt/blob/5dac008ba644...