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rootless-containers
slirp4netns
C2019–2026
rootless-containers / slirp4netns

slirp4netns

User-mode networking for unprivileged network namespaces

7Distinct people
7Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
960GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

User-mode networking for unprivileged network namespaces

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 3:56:07 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year7 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2019-08-26 10:50:37 UTC to 2026-10-09 12:32:30 UTC.

01232019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20192020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20222023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments. Incomplete calendar period.2026*

* An incomplete calendar period is marked with an outlined bar. Its count is not directly comparable with a full period.

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
2026 (partial)2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2027-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303

What Hacker News says

7 sources
> at least half is comments or unit tests Thanks, I see there's a slight (~50%?) overestimation there, but then again, even unit tests and comments in a target programming language count as syntactically correct code that needs to be evaluated and reasoned upon. I'm not that familiar with Rust's runtime introspection features, but in languages like Python, even the comments can directly affect code (e.g. `Foo.__doc__ = Bar.__doc__ + SOME_ANNEX`). > _generate_seccomp_filter ... the entire function doesn't block anything Many thanks! I've applied a fix—it's a single line added. The missing test is pending a runnable that invokes one of the forbidden syscalls. As I have no qualms about force-pushing around a repo that nobody forks, happy to credit you(r LLM) proper! > Main script invokes working directory's .env as shellcode The sandboxed pr
Read the rest
ocess can't overwrite existing .env files [1], but it could create a new $PWD/.env file, hoping to "escape" at next sandbox execution. That's a valid concern I'll have to think about some more. [1]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run/blob/c97d065184... > Lots of race conditions I sometimes experience "Slirp not ready in time" [2], but it's due to a so far unexplained upstream issue [3]. I you have time/tokens to spare, I'd appreciate those PRs and further similar feedback! [2]: https://github.com/sandbox-utils/sandbox-run/blob/c97d065184... [3]: https://github.com/rootless-containers/slirp4netns/issues/35... Don't know whether it's a good idea. It sure has got its issues. But even as the SLOC count and the number of bugs metrics are proved correlated in literature [4], min SLOC is not the primary target—a reasonably graspable and stable composition of few dependencies is. Whereas overreliance on third parties nowadays often ends with a rug pull one way or another. We simply can't count on this "MXC" (...) to be maintainable/non-archived even a year from now, just when I'd get it all properly integrated and set up. [4]: https://softwareengineering.stackexchange.com/questions/1856... > slightly concerned Oh, I certainly wouldn't like to limit myself to promoting just this repo! ^D^ HN is a good venue, lots of smart people around! I see everyone shilling their own sh** all the time. Often in green usernames. :shrug:
In MXC - a sandboxed code execution system
I use this setup as well. I've written an alias for bwrap which only gives the agent access to the current directory and read only access to the docs. It has read-only access to my binaries, and I worry which programs I have might be a fingerprinting issue. I've thought about mounting a alternate /bin which using a docker image. (docker export) Have you managed to setup any firewall or protection for the API keys? I know this is out-of-scope for bwrap. edit: Maybe https://github.com/rootless-containers/slirp4netns could work
In Annoying and alarming things about OpenCode

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