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RUB-SysSec
Microcode
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RUB-SysSec / Microcode

Microcode

Microcode Updates for the USENIX 2017 paper: Reverse Engineering x86 Processor Microcode

5Distinct people
7Mentions
0Explicit recommenders
359GitHub stars
REPOSITORY AT A GLANCE

What to know before exploring

What it is

Microcode Updates for the USENIX 2017 paper: Reverse Engineering x86 Processor Microcode

GitHub

Where it is used

No documented product use has been verified yet.

What people are saying

No recommendation phrase was found in the indexed comments.

No classified warning is attached to this page. Read the discussions before treating silence as approval.

Also in these discussions

No other repository is repeatedly linked in the same discussions.

This week on Hacker News

Nov 7–Nov 14 UTC · Direct repository links and separately labeled related project stories. Indexed through 11/14/2026, 6:01:08 PM UTC.

No direct repository links were found in the indexed HN discussions over the past seven days. Older discussions are available below.

Mentions over time

HN mentions by year7 dated mentions

Observed mentions: 2017-09-11 16:02:49 UTC to 2025-03-06 13:19:00 UTC.

01232017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments20172018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments20212022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 3 mentions; 0 submissions, 3 comments2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 0 mentions; 0 submissions, 0 comments2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC to 2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC (exclusive): 1 mentions; 0 submissions, 1 comments2025

Counts come from the repository’s dated source evidence. Index cutoff: 2026-11-02 08:16:59 UTC.

View mention counts and date ranges
UTC ranges include their start and exclude their end. Select a period to filter the source evidence.
PeriodStart (UTC)End (exclusive, UTC)MentionsSubmissionsComments
20172017-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20182018-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20192019-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20202020-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20212021-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20222022-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101
20232023-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC303
20242024-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC000
20252025-01-01 00:00:00 UTC2026-01-01 00:00:00 UTC101

What Hacker News says

3 sources
Related: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=27334855 https://www.google.com/search?q=%22christopher+domas%22+x86+... https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternate_Instruction_Set >"In 2018 Christopher Domas discovered that some Samuel 2 processors came with the Alternate Instruction Set enabled by default and that by executing AIS instructions from user space, it was possible to gain privilege escalation from Ring 3 to Ring 0.[5] Domas had partially reverse engineered the AIS instruction set using automated fuzzing against a cluster of seven thin clients.[12] Domas used the terms "deeply embedded core" (DEC) plus "deeply embedded instruction set" (DEIS) for the RISC instruction set, "launch instruction" for JMPAI, "bridge instruction" for the x86 prefix wrapper, "global configuration register" for the Feature Control Register (FCR), and docum
Read the rest
ented the privilege escalation with the name "Rosenbridge".[5]" Also -- I should point out that the debate of if x86 (CISC) CPU's contain RISC cores -- is largely academic. Both RISC and CISC CPU's contain ALU's -- so our only debate, really, if we have one, is how exactly data that the ALU is going to process -- is going to wind up at the ALU... It is well known in the x86 community that the x86 instructions are an abstraction, a level of abstraction which runs on top of lower-level of abstraction, the x86 microcode layer... Historically, intentionally or unintentionally, most x86 vendors have done everything they can to hide, obfuscate, and obscure this layer... There (to the best of my knowledge, at this point in time) is no official documentation of this layer, how it works (etc., etc.) from any any major x86 vendor. x86 microcode update blobs -- are binary "black boxes" and encrypted. Most of our (limited) knowledge in this area comes from various others who have attempted to understand the internal workings of x86 microcode: https://www.google.com/search?q=%22reverse+engineering+x86+p... https://github.com/RUB-SysSec/Microcode https://twitter.com/_markel___/status/1262697756805795841 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lY5kucyhKFc It should be pointed out that even if a complete understanding of x86 microcode were to be had for one generation of CPU -- there would always be successive generations where that implementation might change -- leaving anyone who would wish to fully understand it, back at square one... To (mis)quote Douglas Adams: "There is a theory which states that if ever anyone discovers exactly what the x86 microcode layer is for and why it is here, it will instantly disappear and be replaced by something even more bizarre and inexplicable." There is another theory which states that this has already happened." :-) <g>
In The legend of “x86 CPUs decode instructions into RISC form internally” (2020)
For the Intel stuff you're talking about, there's three classes keys in play, two of which have been leaked, but not the one that allows you to impersonate Intel. What we have are the keys shipped on every actual system (that has been cracked, I think that's just for Goldmont), the symmetric encrypt/decrypt key (AES IIRC), and the public signing key to verify that it came from Intel. Intel's private keys behind the signature haven't been leaked. Interestingly though, it turns out that AMD K10 microcode updates weren't signed and had only the laziest form of encryption, allowing some security researchers to make custom ucode updates using this toolchain they posted on github: https://github.com/RUB-SysSec/Microcode
In On “I don't trust microcode” (2021)

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